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This dissertation consists of three essays that study the industrial organization of China’s 
manufacturing sector from an empirical perspective. It focuses on applying industrial 
organization theory and econometrics to the analysis of the effects of market forces and 
globalization forces on the productivity of China’s manufacturing firms. 
Chapter 2 examines theories of vertical specialization dated back to Adam Smith. China’s 
economic reform offers an ideal opportunity to test the relationship between the market forces 
and vertical specialization of firms. Using a comprehensive firm-level dataset in China’s 
manufacturing sector, we find that vertical specialization increases total factor productivity of 
firms. Our estimation results support Smith’s extent-of-market theory, Marshall’s input sharing 
theory and Coase’s transaction cost theory, but not Stigler’s theory of industry lifecycle. We also 
find that transaction cost theory is more powerful than other theories in explaining vertical 
specialization of firms. Market reform that facilitates inter-firm transactions is the driving force 
behind the vertical specialization process that occurred in China’s manufacturing firms during 
the reform period. 
Using a panel dataset of China’s manufacturing firms from 2000 to 2003, Chapter 3 
examines whether there exist productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment to domestic 
firms. In estimating productivity, we control for a possible simultaneity bias by using semi-
parametric estimation techniques. We investigate FDI spillovers through horizontal, backward, 
 iv
forward and local linkages. Moreover, we allow for different spillover effects depending on the 
origin and market orientation of FDI and domestic firms’ absorptive capacity. Our evidence 
suggests that FDI in China tends to generate spillovers mainly through backward and local 
linkages. We find little evidence of horizontal and forward spillovers. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between firm productivity and export behavior in 
China’s manufacturing firms. We find that exporters show superior initial performance relative 
to non-exporters, which is consistent with the self-selection hypothesis. Moreover, using 
matching and difference-in-difference methods, we find strong evidence supporting the learning-
by-exporting hypothesis. On average, exporting raises the productivity by 13 percent in the first 
year. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background of the Dissertation 
In December 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a historic 
meeting in Beijing. One of the important decisions made at this meeting was to adopt reform and 
open-door policies. The reform policy was aimed at invigorating the economy through market-
oriented reforms. The open-door policy was expected to utilize the opportunities in the 
international economy. Since then, China has embarked on a gradual switch from a planned 
economy to a market economy and from a closed economy to an open economy. It turned out 
that marketization and internationalization became two most fundamental changes in China’s 
economy in the past twenty-five years. This dissertation collects three empirical studies aiming at 
assessing the impacts of market forces and globalization forces on the China’s manufacturing 
firms.  
Chapter 2 studies the market forces. It examines the effects of market expansion and 
reduction of transaction cost on vertical specialization of firms. We test alternative theories of 
vertical specialization dating back to Adam Smith. These widely accepted theories have 
surprisingly little empirical support. This chapter attempts to fill the gap in the literature by 
exploiting rich variation in regional market development and vertical specialization in China’s 
manufacturing sector. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 study the globalization forces. We distinguish the impacts of 
“passive” internationalization from “active” internationalization. Chapter 3 focuses on “passive” 
 1
 internationalization, looking at the effects of inward foreign direct investment on domestic firms. 
Chapter 4 examines “active” internationalization, testing the impacts of active exporting on 
firms’ performance.  
The rest of Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the three topics in this dissertation: vertical 
specialization, FDI and exporting. 
 
1.2. Vertical Specialization and Firm Performance 
When production involves more than one stage, firms must decide whether to vertically 
specialize or integrate all stages. The study of vertical specialization goes far back to Adam 
Smith’s idea of division of labor. In the very first sentence of Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith 
claims that, “the greatest improvement in the productive power of labor, and the greater skill, 
dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed or applied, seem to have been the 
effects of the division of labor” (Smith, 1776, Chapter 1). Division of labor allows workers to 
exploit their comparative advantage, improve their skills, and increase the efficiency of firms. 
Although Adam Smith’s original idea was about specialization within a firm, his insight has been 
extended to specialization between firms (Young, 1928; Stigler, 1951). 
Adam Smith further claims that division of labor is limited by the extent of market. Based 
on this idea, Stigler (1951) discusses the relationship between vertical specialization and industry 
lifecycle. He argues that new industries are usually vertically integrated. Then as intermediate-
inputs suppliers enter the market, the degree of vertical specialization rises. In the declining stage 
of the lifecycle, the industries become vertically integrated again. Also following the idea of 
extent of market, Marshall (1920) explains that industries concentrated in particular regions 
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 should be more vertically specialized because input sharing allows the emergence of more 
specialized intermediate-inputs suppliers. 
Another related theory is the transaction cost literature originated by Coase (1937) and 
further developed by Williamson (1975, 1985). Coase argues that a firm will purchase from the 
market if the cost of organizing production within the firm is higher than the cost of carrying out 
the transaction through the market. Thus, a firm’s vertical specialization decision rests on the 
comparison of internal organizational cost and external market transaction cost. 
Given the importance of these ideas in economics, one might presume that there is 
extensive empirical study on the nature of vertical specialization. Surprisingly, this is not the 
case. In particular, at the firm level, there is little systematic evidence quantifying vertical 
specialization (Perry, 1989). A rare example of the firm-level empirical evidence on Smith’s idea 
that vertical specialization increases productivity appears in Murakami, Liu and Otsuka’s (1996) 
study of China’s machine tool industry. There is no firm-level empirical study of Smith’s idea of 
extent of market, because existing empirical work focuses either on nation or state level data 
(Ades and Glaeser, 1999), or on the division of labor within firms (Ippolito, 1977; Caricano and 
Hubbard, 2003). Stigler’s industry lifecycle theory was tested by Tucker and Wilder (1977), 
among others, with mixed results. Holmes (1999) finds evidence from U.S. that supports 
Marshall’s theory. There are also some studies on agglomeration and input sharing in regional 
economics. The transaction cost literature provides relatively abundant firm-level evidence, but 
most of it comes from case studies. 
There may be two reasons for the lack of empirical study. First, the availability of large 
firm-level dataset has always been a major difficulty for researchers (Yang and Ng, 1993, pp. 
434-436). Our dataset provides extremely detailed information for all state firms and all non-
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 state firms1 with sales above 5 million Yuan (or about $600,000) in China’s manufacturing 
sector in 2002. Total number of firms in our dataset exceeds 160,000. Second, in a mature 
market economy like the United States, cross section and time series variations of market 
development and vertical specialization are quite small. In the past forty years, the vertical 
specialization index of U.S. manufacturing changed by only one percentage point.2 As we see in 
Figure 1.1, China’s substantial rise in vertical specialization was accompanied by enormous 
growth of market forces during the reform period, which began in the late 1970s. The 
development of market system also differed markedly across sectors and regions in China. We 
believe that China’s market reform offers a unique opportunity to examine the effects of market 
expansion and reduction of transaction cost on vertical specialization of firms. 
This dissertation is the first study that examines all the alternative theories simultaneously 
and compares their explanatory power. In Chapter 2, using industry size as an instrument for 
vertical specialization, we find that an increase in vertical specialization raises total factor 
productivity of the firms. Our OLS estimation of the determinants of vertical specialization 
supports Smith’s extent-of-market theory, Marshall’s input sharing theory and Coase’s 
transaction cost theory. In terms of quantitative significance, our results suggest that transaction 
cost may have the largest impact on vertical specialization of firms, which implies that market 
reform in China that facilitates inter-firm transactions and reduces transaction cost is the driving 
force of the vertical disintegration process after the reform. However, we fail to find strong 
evidence in support of Stigler’s industry lifecycle theory. 
 
                                                 
1 “State firms” include all wholly state-owned firms and state shareholding firms. 
2 Vertical specialization index is defined as 1-value added/sales. See discussions in Section 2.1. Vertical 
specialization index of U.S. manufacturing decreased from 0.54 in 1963 to 0.53 in 2001. Source: Author’s 
calculation based on Statistical Abstracts of United States (1970) and (2003). 
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 1.3. FDI and Spillover effects 
One of the primary motivations for governments around the world to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is the belief that FDI will generate positive spillovers to domestic firms. World 
Bank (1993) writes that “FDI brings with it considerable benefits: technology transfer, 
management know-how, and export marketing access. Many developing countries will need to 
be more effective in attracting FDI flows if they are to close the technology gap with high-
income countries, upgrade managerial skills, and develop their export markets.” These claims 
have encouraged developing countries as well as developed countries to create costly programs, 
such as tax breaks, subsidized industrial infrastructure, and duty exemptions, in order to attract 
FDI. From 1991 to 2002, developing countries made over 1,500 regulatory changes favorable to 
FDI (UNCTAD, 2003, p.21). 
Despite its importance to policy choices, recent empirical studies on FDI spillovers find 
mixed results. In a summary of the existing evidence, Rodrik (1999, p.37) concludes, “today’s 
policy literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers from FDI, but the hard 
evidence is sobering.”  
According to the theories, FDI spillovers can work through a number of channels. First, 
domestic firms can benefit from the presence of FDI in the same industry, leading to intra-
industry or horizontal spillovers, through labor turnover, demonstration effects, competition 
effects, etc. Second, there may be spillovers from foreign firms operating in other industries,3 
leading to inter-industry or vertical spillovers. This type of spillover effect is often attributed to 
buyer-supplier linkages and therefore may be towards upstream (backward spillovers) or 
                                                 
3 Here “foreign firms” include all firms partly or fully funded by investors from foreign countries as well as Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
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 downstream industries (forward spillovers). Third, domestic firms may also benefit from the FDI 
in the same region, leading to local spillovers. 
Chapter 3 examines the extent of FDI spillovers using firm-level panel data from China’s 
manufacturing sector. China is of particular interest because it is the largest economy among 
developing countries, and more importantly the largest recipient of FDI in the world. Guided by 
FDI-oriented philosophy, Chinese local governments at all levels compete with each other to 
offer tax breaks and other incentives to foreign investors. In the past 25 years, tens of thousands 
of global corporations invested in China, bringing with them over 560 billion dollars in FDI. 
Figure 1.2 shows the FDI inflow into China between 1980 and 2004. 
The general approach in this chapter is to regress firm-level TFP on measures of foreign 
presence in the firm’s related industries and region. We use a first differences model to remove 
firm-specific unobservable variables. In line with previous studies such as Pavcnik (2002) and 
Javorcik (2004), we employ a semi-parametric estimation technique following Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) to get consistent estimates of total factor productivity (TFP). 
We find strong effects of backward and local spillovers. In our study, however, there is 
little evidence of horizontal and forward spillovers. We further conduct several robustness 
checks. First, we allow the effect of spillovers to differ for overseas Chinese FDI and OECD 
FDI. Second, we allow for the heterogeneity of FDI by distinguishing spillovers from primarily 
export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented FDI. Third, we allow for different spillover effects 
depending on domestic firms’ absorptive capacity. The results of the robustness checks are 
consistent with our main findings. 
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 1.4. Exporting and Performance 
A growing body of empirical literature has documented the superior performance of exporters 
relative to non-exporters. The theories suggest at least two mechanisms that can explain a 
positive correlation between exporting and productivity. The first is related to self-selection: only 
the best firms are able to compete in the international markets. The second explanation is 
“learning-by-exporting”: after firms enter the export markets, they gain new knowledge and 
expertise that improve their productivity. While the self-selection hypothesis has been confirmed 
by various studies, the evidence on the learning hypothesis is mixed. In this dissertation, we 
carry out empirical tests for both hypotheses using a large panel dataset from China’s 
manufacturing firms. 
Learning-by-exporting theory is often cited as an argument for active export promotion 
policies such as export subsidies in developing countries. World Bank (1998) writes that, 
“improving the policy and business environments to create conditions favorable to trade, 
especially exports, is one of the most important ways for countries to obtain knowledge from 
abroad.” In particular, the economic success of East Asian economies has been attributed, to a 
large extent, to the export-led development strategy. For example, Krueger (1995) argues that the 
key distinction between East Asian success and Latin American stagnation is the openness of 
international trading regimes in East Asia. Our study sheds some light on these policy issues, 
although the hypotheses tested in this chapter are only a subset of the arguments for export 
promotion. 
There is an ongoing debate on the link between exports and growth. Some economists 
believe that exports generate economic growth (e.g., Edwards, 1998) while others argue that the 
reality is more complicated and the role of exports overstated (e.g., Rodrik and Rodriguez, 
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 2000). Our study contributes to this basically macroeconomic debate by adding microeconomic 
evidence. 
Being a major exporter in the world, the case of China is of considerable interest in this 
context. Since the economic reform started in the late 1970s, China’s government has actively 
promoted exports. In 1978, the share of China’s exports in world trade was negligible. After a 
quarter century of rapid growth, China surpassed Japan as the world’s third largest trading 
economy (behind the United States and Germany) in 2004.4 Figure 1.3 shows the growth of 
China exports between 1980 and 2004.  
In searching for causal links between exporting and firm productivity, we use propensity 
score matching and difference-in-difference techniques developed in microeconometrics (e.g., 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). Such methods allow us to construct a reasonable 
counterfactual and determine the changes in productivity that can be reliably attributed to 
exporting. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that Chinese exporters 
and non-exporters differ significantly. The exporters tend to have higher TFP but lower labor 
productivity. They are larger, less capital intensive and pay higher wages. Second, our estimation 
from a probit model shows that more productive firms self-select into export markets. Third, our 
difference-in-difference estimates based on matched samples suggest that exporting helps 
improve performance. On average, exporting raises the productivity by 13 percentage points in 
the first year. The learning effects of exporting last at lest three years. Fourth, we distinguish 
foreign invested firms from domestic firms. We find that although multinationals usually have 
more international experience and are often closer to the world technology frontier, there are still 
                                                 
4 Source: “China replaced Japan as world’s 3rd largest exporter,” People’s Daily online, April 15, 2005. 
http://english.people.com.cn/200504/15/eng20050415_181246.html. 
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 significant learning effects for foreign invested firms in China. However, compared to domestic 
firms, the size of their learning effects is smaller. In summary, our results support both self-
selection and learning-by-exporting theories. 
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Figure 1.1   Evolution of Vertical Specialization of China’s Industry (1980-2000) 
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Notes: Vertical specialization index is defined as 1 – Value Added/Gross Output. Series 1 does not control for 
structural change. Series 2 controls for structural change. In Series 2, 1980 industry output shares are used as weights 
to calculate weighted average. 
    Sources: 1980 and 1985  Author’s calculation based on  Industry Volume, The Data of Industrial Census of People’s 
Republic of China in 1985. 
               1990  Author’s calculation based on  China Statistical Yearbook (1991). 
                   1995  Author’s calculation based on Industry Volume, The Data of Third National Industrial Census of 
People’s Republic of China in 1995. 
               2000  Author’s calculation based on  China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
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Figure 1.2   FDI Inflow into China (1983-2004) 
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Figure 1.3   China’s Exports (1980-2004) 
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2. VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION OF FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 
2.1. Conceptual Framework 
two or more sequential stages; (2) 
two or
 the same 
city, ve
I), 
defined as the ratio of intermediate inp  of intermediate 
inputs and value added, VSI is also equal to one minus the ratio of value added to sales. Thus, 
                                                
Vertical specialization occurs when: (1) a good is produced in 
 more firms provide value added during its production. “Vertical disintegration” and 
“outsourcing” are common synonyms conveying similar idea.5
Technology is probably the most important determinant of vertical specialization. Some 
industries are less decomposable than others. A typical example is the energy saving from not 
having to reheat steel in the production of steel sheet. Technology explains why even in
rtical specialization of firms varies widely by industry. In the regression, we will include 
two-digit industry dummies to control for the industry-specific technology differences. 
Our measure of vertical specialization of firms is the vertical specialization index (VS
uts to sales. Since total sales are the sum
 
5 There is a closely related but different concept of vertical specialization in international trade literature. Rather 
than produce final products, countries increasingly specialize in particular stages of production (Yi, 2003). This 
leads to discussions of vertical specialization spanning regions or countries. It differs from our concept which 
focuses on specialization among firms. To illustrate the difference, suppose a multinational firm operates several 
subsidiaries in different countries. Vertical specialization of countries occurs if these subsidiaries constitute a global 
vertical production chain. According to our definition, however, vertical specialization is zero because this activity 
is confined within a single firm. 
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 ,1
Y
VA
Y
MVSI −==      (2.1) 
where M is intermediate inputs, VA is value added, and Y is sales. If a firm were entirely 
vertically integrated, 
 
have lower VSI than a firm in later stages of production. This limitation complicates cross-
ining 
and utilities and focus only on manufacturing sector. In addition, our two-digit industry dummies 
no change in vertical specialization. This is particularly relevant in China. Before reform, the 
liberalized price system, the relative prices of raw materials rose rapidly. Since an increase in the 
evolution of VSI in China’s industrial sector, we include the mining and utilities industries and 
The use of VSI was pioneered by Adeleman (1955). Despite these shortcomings, it is 
re (see, for example, Tucker and Wilder, 1977; Levy, 
1984; Holmes, 1999). 
 
VSI would be zero. Over time, an increase (decrease) in VSI suggests that a 
firm has become more vertically specialized (integrated). 
However, VSI is not a perfect measure of vertical specialization. First, given the same
amount of value adding activity, a firm that specializes in the earlier stages of production will 
sectional comparison of industries or firms. In the regression analysis, we will exclude m
in the regression should control for the positions of industries in the production chain. 
Second, a change in relative prices of final products will change VSI even when there is 
prices of raw materials such as coal were artificially depressed by the government. When reform 
relative prices of raw materials tends to raise VSI in the downstream sectors, time-series 
comparison of VSI requires caution. To deal with this problem, in Section 2.2, when we study the 
control for structural change by using 1980 fixed industry weights. 
widely accepted and used in the literatu
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 2.2. Evolution of Vertical Specialization in China’s Industrial Sector 
After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, Chinese economic system was 
modeled on the Soviet planned economy. Vertical integration of firms was a hallmark of China’s 
industrial structure under planning system.6 As shown by Table 2.1, VSI defined by net value 
decreased from 0.68 in 1949 to 0.62 in 1970 and remained below 0.65 in the 1970s.7 Vertically 
integrated firms were often referred to as “big and complete” or “small and complete.” In 1976, 
for example, 80 percent of over 6,100 firms under the supervision of the First Machinery 
Ministry were “full-function” firms (Ji and Rong, 1980). Because Chinese firms relied heavily 
on self-supply, most of the large and medium firms even built their own schools and hospitals. It 
is widely acknowledged by Chinese economists that such production structure of firms fails to 
reach the optimal scale and scope (Sheng, 1994, pp. 1-5). Chinese government began to address 
this problem as early as the 1950s. However, little progress had been made until the reform 
began in the late 1970s (Rawski, 1980). 
Why do firms in planned economies tend to be more vertically integrated than their 
market economy counterparts? Coase’s idea of transaction cost can be applied to socialist firms 
with slight modification. Although there is no formal market transaction in a planned economy, 
other types of external transaction costs do exist and can be very high. According to Kornai 
(1980), Soviet-type firms face chronic vertical shortage as well as horizontal shortage (pp. 200-
201). In the presence of vertical shortage, firms’ requests for resources are frequently turned 
down by administrative authority because the sum of claims often exceeds the quantity available 
                                                 
6 The lack of vertical specialization is a universal problem of all socialist economies. See, for example, Berliner 
(1957) and Granick (1960) for the Soviet Union, and Rawski (1980) and Sheng (1994) for China. 
7 China’s statistical system did not report value added until 1992. Net value = value added -- depreciation (National 
Statistical Bureau, 1992). 
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 to the authority. Even if the administrative authority meets the requests, firms still face horizontal 
shortage. In the relationship of seller and buyer, refused orders, long waiting time and forced 
substitution are not unusual. In order to get full supply on time, firms must bargain with 
administrative authority and suppliers. When such costs exceed in-house organizational cost, it is 
optimal for the firms to produce intermediate inputs internally. Coase’s original idea is to 
compare the costs associated with hierarchy and market. In a planned economy, firm’s decision 
is actually based on comparing internal hierarchy cost with external hierarchy cost. Our 
explanation here is consistent with the behavior of Chinese firms. Rawski (1980) finds that 
before reform, Chinese managers often preferred to make rather than buy inputs because they 
wanted to reduce the dependence on potentially unreliable suppliers (p. 128). 
China’s tax system borrowed from the Soviet Union was based on sales taxes (Wong and 
Bird, 2004). By taxing the portion of sales, the product taxes or industrial-commercial taxes 
encouraged vertical integration within firms. In 1994, Chinese government replaced the old tax 
system with value added taxes and eliminated such distortionary effect. 
When reform began in the late 1970s, markets emerged and developed quickly. As a 
result, state firms purchased more and more intermediate inputs through markets. In the 
machinery industry, for example, thousands of parts production units within those “full-function” 
firms were spun off during the “sixth five-year plan” period between 1981 and 1985 (He, 1990, 
p. 92). The government also merged different firms’ production units with similar products into 
“specialized firms” (He, 1990, pp. 94-96). In addition, new foreign firms, private firms and 
township and village enterprises entered the markets of intermediate inputs, supplying 
specialized products to state firms. 
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 Murakami, Liu and Otsuka (1996) study a survey of 44 firms in China’s machine tool 
industry. They find a positive relationship between production efficiency and purchased parts 
ratio in 1991 but not in 1980. Their results suggest that at the beginning of the reform, vertical 
integration production structure still had an advantage over vertical specialization. The 
comparative advantage of vertical integration declined gradually and almost disappeared in the 
1980s. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of VSI in China’s industrial sector after reform. The 
VSI continued to rise between 1980 and 1995 and declined slightly after 1995. There are two 
possible reasons why the trend was reversed after 1995. First, China National Statistical Bureau 
(NBS) changed the definition and coverage of gross industrial output in 1995 (for details, see 
NBS, 1997, pp. 89-106). The new definition reduced the level of 1995 gross industrial output by 
about 10 percent (Third National Industrial Census Office, 1997, p. 46). Second, in 1998, NBS 
revised its statistical system to limit the coverage to state firms and those non-state firms 
reporting more than 5 million Yuan in annual sales. To the extent that smaller firms are more 
vertically specialized, excluding small non-state firms may lower VSI. 
Since the change in industry structure and relative price may affect VSI, we control for 
the structural change by calculating industry weighted average of VSI with weights being 1980 
industry output shares. As shown in Series 2 of Figure 1.1, controlling for structural change does 
not make much difference. 
     The evolution of vertical specialization of two-digit industries is reported in Table 2.2. 
Between 1980 and 2000, the largest increase in VSI occurred in petroleum processing, coking 
products and gas production. During the twenty-year period, 27 out of 31 two-digit industries 
became more vertically specialized. 
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      Table 2.3 documents the regional evolution of VSI between 1980 and 2000. Zhejiang was 
the most vertically specialized province in 2000, followed by Tianjin, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and 
Guangdong, all located in the most developed coastal region. The five least vertically specialized 
regions in 2000 were Tibet, Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, all located in 
interior regions that form part of China’s land borders. The last two rows of Table 2.3 compare 
coastal regions with non-coastal regions. In 1980, the coastal regions were not very different 
from non-coastal regions in terms of vertical specialization. After twenty years of reform, the 
average VSI of coastal regions was 8.1 percentage points above that of non-coastal regions in 
2000. Actually, the average VSI of non-coastal regions even decreased between 1980 and 2000. 
 
2.3. Theories and Hypotheses 
Theories of vertical specialization address two questions. First, what determines the degree of 
vertical specialization across firms? Second, does vertical specialization improve firms’ 
productivity? In this section, we first introduce a simple model of vertical specialization that 
attempts to answer both questions. Then on the basis of existing theories and the model, we 
develop testable hypotheses. 
 
2.3.1. A Theoretical Example 
In a very influential paper, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) construct a theoretical model of competition 
under increasing returns. In the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, Holmes (1999) develops a model that 
shows the relationship between geographic concentration and vertical specialization. Here we 
incorporate the transaction cost and labor productivity into the model and use it to derive 
predictions that are consistent with major theories of vertical specialization. 
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 Assume there is only one industry in the economy, which is populated by L individuals. 
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor. Only one firm produces final good but there 
are many intermediate good producers. There is a continuum of intermediate goods that are 
differentiated and indexed by . Each intermediate good producer specializes in the 
production of one good. We further assume that in the equilibrium there is only one producer of 
each intermediate good. The final-good producer uses labor and intermediate goods to produce 
final good that will be consumed by all L individuals. In this context, the final-good producer can 
be a car assembly firm, purchasing various auto parts manufactured by specialized firms. 
]1,0[∈x
The production function of the final good is specified as follows: 
( ) ,)()(, 1 ρα ⎟⎟⎠⎜
⎜
⎝
= ∫− dxxmlxmlf   
where l is the labor directly used in final good production and )(xm  denotes the quantity of 
1
α
0
ρ⎞⎛
   (2.2) 
intermediate good x. The production function has a Cobb-Douglas form
where M can be treated as a composite intermediate good 
: ( ) αα MlMlf −= 1, , 
and its production function is given by 
,)( ρ ⎟⎟⎜⎜= ∫ dxxmM       (2.3) 
1
1
0
ρ
⎠
⎞
⎝
⎛
The CES-type functional form of M has important properties of constant returns to scale 
and constant elasticity of substitution. 
The technology allows firms to produce one unit of intermediate good with one unit of 
labor. The final-good firm can produce intermediate goods by itself. Alternatively, it can 
purchase intermediate goods from the specialized firms. 
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 If intermediate goods are manufactured within the final-good firm, there is an extra cost 
of γ  units of labor that is proportional to the quantity produced. This additional cost is needed to 
coordinate the production of different goods. Thus, in-house production of  units of 
intermediate good x costs the final-good firm 
)(xm
)()1( xmγ+  units of labor. We assume 
that 1)1( >>+ ργ . Basically this assumption states that the coordination cost should be high 
enough to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium. Specialized intermediate-good firms do not 
have coordination cost because they produce only one good. However, a fixed set-up cost of 
1
θ  
units of labor occurs when the firm is establi . In addition, there is a transaction cost ofshed  δ  
units of labor that is devoted to contract negotiation or contract enforcement. Assume δ  is fixed 
and independent of quantity produced. For simplicity, we further assume that specialized firms 
bear all the transaction cost. Therefore, the labor cost of  units of interm x
equal to 
 )(xm ediate good  is 
( )δθ ++)(xm  if the good is produced in a specialized firm. It can be easily seen that the 
The final good is taken as the numeraire (price set to unity). Let w denote the price of
labor in ter
marginal cost of specialized firms is lower, while the disadvantages of specialized firms are the 
fixed set-up cost and transaction cost. 
 
ms of final good. Without loss of generality, assume all the intermediate goods 
produced by
intermediate good x. The remaining intermediate goods indexed s to 1 are produced by the final-
good firm. 
The final-good firm maximizes its profit by choosing labor l and a vector of intermediate 
goods: 
 specialized firms are indexed between 0 and s. Let )(xp  be the price of specialized 
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The first term is the value of total output. The second term is final-good firm’s total 
expenditure on specialized intermediate goods. The third term is total labor cost associated with 
producing intermediate goods within the firm. It is equal to the sum of quantity of labor used in 
internal production and coordination, )()1( xmγ+ , multiplied by labor price, w. The last term is 
total cost of labor directly applied in final-good production. 
Given the symmetry of the intermediate goods, let  and  be the equilibrium output 
price of a representative specialized intermediate good and  represent the equilibrium 
output of a typical internally produced interm
and  yields the following first order conditions 
Sm Sp
and Im
ediate good. Taking derivatives with respect to Sm  
Im
,)( 1
1
0
⎟⎠⎜⎝
and 
1
SS pmdxxml =⎟
⎞⎜⎛ −
−
− ∫ ρρ
ρα
ραα      (2.5) 
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1
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−
0
wmdxxml I γα +=⎟⎠⎜⎝∫     (2.6) 
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) imply that 
  .)1(
1
SS
I wm γρ +=⎟⎟
⎞
⎜⎜
⎛ −
      (2.7) 
pm ⎠⎝
With constant elasticity, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) give the standard result to pin down 
: profit maximization of specialized firms implies that price is a constant markup over Sp
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 marginal cost, or ρ
wp = . AssumiS ng free entry, we can derive the zero profit condition for 
specialized firms 
).( δθρ S
wm
e left-hand side is sales revenue and the right-hand side is total cost. Solving (2.8) 
for equilibrium output
++=S mw      (2.8) 
Here th
 of the specialized intermediate good gives 
.)(
1 ρ
δθρ
−
+=Sm       (2.9) 
Plugging ρpS =  into (2.7) yields 
w
[ ] .)1( 11 SI mm −+= ρργ      (2.10) 
Since our final-good production function is Cobb-Dougla
show that the equilibrium quantity of labor directly applied to final good production 
equals
s form in nature, it is easy to 
*l  
L)1( α− . The rest of labor in the economy is allocated to the production of intermediate 
goods. Thus we have 
.)1)(1()( Lmsms IS αγδθ =+−+++     (2.11) 
Recall that s is the measure of the set of differentiated intermediate goods that are 
produced by specialized firms. Plugging (2.9) and (2.10) into (2.11) and solving for s give 
 
[ ]
[ ] .1
)1()1(
)(
1
1−++−+
)1( 1−
=
ρργγδθρ
)1()1( 1−++− ρργγρ
ραL
s     (2.12) 
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 Given the assumption that 11)1( >>+ γ , it is straightforward to show ρ
[ ] 0)1()1(1 1 >++− −ρργγρ  and therefore 
1
0>∂
∂
L
s . Our result is consistent with Adam Smith’s 
extent-of-market theory: when the industry size (em loyment in the model) increases, more 
intermediate goods will be produced by specialized firms. 
p
L. s will be zero if Since ]1,0[∈s , we have two critical values for 
[ ] .
)1(
)1()( 1
1
L 1 ρα
ργδθρ ρ
−
++=≤ −L      (2.13) 
And 1=s   when 
.
)1(2 ρα
δθ
−
+=≥ LL       (2.14) 
To summarize, when the industry size is small, all intermediate goods will be produced 
internally by the final-good producer. After industry size exceeds , the range of intermediate 
goods produced by final-good firm decreases and specialized firms begin to produce some 
intermediate goods. If the industry size is larger than , all intermediate goods will be produced 
by specialized firms. The following prediction summarizes the discussion. 
Prediction 1: When 
1L
2L
,21 LLL ≥≥  0>∂
∂
L
s . 
o theory. From (2.12), it is straightforward to 
show th
The m del also supports transaction cost 
e following prediction. 
Prediction 2: Under the assumptions in the model, 0<∂
∂
δ . 
This prediction implies that the final-good producer will spin off 
s
more intermediate 
goods production to specialized firms when transaction cost is lower. 
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 Now let us examine the relationship between productivity and vertical specialization. In 
equilibrium, total income equals total output of final good. So we have the following equation 
[ ] [ ] .)1()1()1( 11 ρ
α
ρ ρρρα ργ ⎭⎬
⎫⎧ +− −− Sms    (2.15) 
Solving (2.11) for L and plugging it into (2.15) lead to an expression for w
α ⎩⎨ +−= SsmLwL
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Since 
⎬⎫⎨⎧ +−+−= ssw    (2.16) 
11)1( >>+ γ , we have the following prediction. ρ
Prediction 3: Under the assumptions in the model, 0>∂
∂
s
w . 
B d as wage rate or labor productivity, the model predicts that a ecause w can be interprete
higher degree of vertical specialization raises living standard or productivity. 
Our measure of vertical specialization equals intermediate inputs/sales. In the model, we 
have 
./
wL
After rearrangement, (2.17) implies that 
pwsmVSI S=       (2.17) 
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It is easy to verify that VSI is strictly increasing in s. However, the nonlinear relationship 
between VSI and s illustrates the complications of VSI in measuring vertical specialization of 
firms. 
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 2.3.2. Developing Hypotheses 
Now we develop the hypotheses based on the theories and model predictions. We begin with the 
first question raised at the beginning of this section: what determines the vertical specialization 
of firms? The existing theories can be grouped into two categories: extent-of-market theory and 
transaction cost theory. 
The first theory comes from Smith’s famous theorem: the division of labor is limited by 
the ext
to dedicate himself entirely to one employment” (1776, Chapter 3). Smith uses 
the pin
of labor. 
ent of market. Smith writes “when the market is very small, no person can have any 
encouragement 
 factory example to show that division of labor requires a large market. 
Ippolito (1977) formulates Smith’s theory of division of labor within the firm and tests it 
with data from shipbuilding industry during World War II. His results are strongly supportive of 
the theory. In a recent study, Garicano and Hubbard (2003) use a dataset of law firms and find 
that lawyers’ field scope narrows as market size increases and individuals specialize. Ades and 
Glaeser (1999) present some evidence of Smith’s theorem at the regional level. They examine 
twentieth century less developed countries and nineteenth century U.S. states. The authors find in 
both datasets that openness and initial development are substitutes in generating growth. This 
finding indicates the importance of the extent-of-market. They also show that the extent-of-
market works, in part, through deeper division 
To summarize, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms in larger markets tend to have higher degree of vertical 
specialization. 
Marshall (1920) identifies three sources of agglomeration economies: knowledge 
spillovers, labor pooling and input sharing. He believes that geographical concentration of firms 
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 in the same industry creates a market for specialized inputs and lowers the cost of inputs. 
Suppose, for example, an apparel firm is able to purchase buttons from a local firm that 
specializes in button manufacturing. If the button production is subject to increasing returns to 
scale a
of “pur ed inputs divided by sales. He uses pantyhose 
industr
t in the industry. The purchased input intensity of 
pantyh
nd if transportation is costly, then the presence of other apparel firms nearby will allow 
them to purchase their buttons more cheaply. Thus, geographic concentration of an industry 
makes it possible to host more specialized intermediate inputs suppliers. Instead of emphasizing 
internal increasing returns of specialized intermediate-inputs suppliers, Marshall refers to input 
sharing as an example of external economies. 
The input sharing of geographically concentrated firms is modeled in economic 
geography literature (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1995). In an empirical study of U.S. 
manufacturing sector, Holmes (1999) finds that more concentrated industries have a higher value 
chased input intensity,” defined as purchas
y as an example. Pantyhose industry is concentrated in North Carolina, which accounts 
for 62 percent of national employmen
ose industry in North Carolina is 53 percent, compared to 40 percent among other 
pantyhose firms throughout the United States. 
Young (2000) argues that industries have been less concentrated in China because of 
interregional trade barriers and fragmentation of the domestic markets. In contrast, Bai, Du, Tao, 
and Tong (2004) find the evidence that Chinese industries have become increasingly 
concentrated during the reform era. It is well documented that in some Chinese industrial 
clusters, the vertical specialization is highly developed. For example, Jinxiang township of 
Zhejiang province supplies about 40 percent of badges in the world. Over ten stages of 
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 production, from design to packing, are undertaken by different firms. The whole production 
process involves more than 800 firms specializing in different stages of production (Qian, 2003). 
ustry. During the early stages of 
produc e supply of inputs may not 
be ava
ate inputs. The 
integra
ay that is 
consist
Hence, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Vertical specialization of firms tends to rise in the presence of other firms 
of the same industry in the same region. 
Building on Smith’s extent-of-market theory, Stigler (1951) emphasizes that vertical 
specialization is closely related to the lifecycle of an ind
tion, firms are likely to be vertically integrated. A competitiv
ilable because the industry is new. Usually these young firms must design and 
manufacture their own specialized equipment and intermediate inputs. As the industry matures, 
new firms may enter each stage, creating a competitive supply of intermedi
ted firms may also choose to spin off vertically distinct stages into separate firms. In the 
declining stages, the industry becomes vertically integrated again because the market scale can 
no longer support vertically specialized firms. Thus, Stigler writes, “vertical integration should 
be a typical development in the growing industry, with vertical disintegration more prominent in 
declining industries” (1951, p. 82). 
Tucker and Wilder (1977) examine 54 American manufacturing firms and find that 
vertical integration of a firm appears to be related to the age of the firm in a w
ent with Stigler’s idea. Levy (1984) explores census data for 38 industries from 1963, 
1967 and 1972. His results confirm those of Tucker and Wilder. By contrast, Stuckey (1983) 
finds opposite results from a study of the aluminum industry. 
We summarize the discussion with the following hypothesis. 
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 Hypothesis 3: The degree of vertical specialization is low in infant industries, high in 
mature industries, and low in declining industries. In particular, there is an inverted “U” shape 
relatio ertical specialization. 
 transaction cost to explain the boundary of the firms. According to 
Coase,
irm size 
stops a
s 2 and 3 can be 
regarde
nship between industry lifecycle and the degree of v
The second major theory, transaction cost theory, began with the work of Coase (1937), 
in which the author uses
 all market transactions generate transaction costs. Transaction costs can be generally 
summarized as “costs of using the price mechanism.” Coase believes that in-house production 
may replace price mechanism if the cost of coordinating internalized transactions is lower than 
the otherwise cost if the transaction is implemented through markets. The expansion of f
t the point where the organizational cost is equal to the market transaction cost. 
Beginning with Williamson (1975, 1985), a body of literature has developed that clarifies 
the role of transaction cost and asset specificity. The inefficiency from “hold-up” problem gives 
a reason for vertical integration. In property rights theory, Grossman and Hart (1986) analyze the 
vertical integration problem from the perspectives of incomplete contracts and control rights. 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) provide a general equilibrium framework that incorporates these 
models. 
To summarize, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The degree of vertical specialization is higher for firms that face lower 
market transaction cost. 
The hypotheses discussed above are not mutually exclusive. Hypothese
d as the extensions of Hypothesis 1, since theories of industry lifecycle and input sharing 
are built upon Smith’s idea of extent-of-market. Transaction cost theory and extent-of-market 
theory are also closely related because markets expand when transaction cost is reduced. 
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 However, major differences exist between extent-of-market theory and transaction cost 
theory. The extent-of-market theory adopts a disintegration approach, starting with a fully 
integrated firm. It tries to explain why the production process can be divided into different tasks 
that are undertaken by different firms and coordinated by the market mechanism. The focus of 
the theory is the increasing returns of production generated from concentrating on a limited set of 
activities. In contrast, the transaction cost theory adopts an integration approach, starting with 
fully specialized firms. The questions are whether and under what circumstances the vertically 
specialized firms will be integrated. Later development of transaction cost theory focuses on the 
bilateral relationship between the firm and its supplier. It is fair to say that the disintegration 
approach is relatively neglected and underdeveloped as compared with integration approach, 
even though the former has logical and historical advantages (Andersen, 1998). 
Now we turn to the second question. The idea that specialization increases productivity is 
older th
would be able to produce if they worked independently. Smith concludes that there are 
three a
an economics itself. More than 2300 years ago, Plato (380 BC, pp. 102-106) discussed 
the welfare implications of market and division of labor. Adam Smith is commonly referred to as 
the first person to systematically study division of labor. According to Smith, specialization of 
functions and division of labor are fundamental to higher productivity and economic growth. He 
describes how workers in a modern economy do different jobs and enhance each other’s 
productivity. Thus, a group of people working in this way can produce much more per person 
than they 
dvantages of division of labor, each leading to higher productivity: the increase in 
workers’ skill, the saving of time which would be otherwise lost in switches from one type of 
work to another, and the invention of machines that facilitate special tasks. Smith’s view of 
division of labor is broader than what his example of pin factory indicates. He has in mind 
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 specialization not only by skills but also by occupation, firms and industries. In the later context 
of his book, Smith also refers to so-called territorial division of labor, the basis for interregional 
and international trade. 
There are numerous models to formalize Smith’s idea of division of labor. Stigler (1951) 
shows with a graph that a firm’s productivity increases as it narrows down the range of 
production activities. Becker’s model (1981) demonstrates that division of labor occurs when an 
efficient household exploits comparative advantage among household members. In Kim (1989), 
labor specialization is modeled based on each worker’s human capital decision. Yang and 
Borland
e. For Ricardo, ex ante difference in productivity generates 
special ce in productivity. In the 
interna
 advantage” from “natural comparative advantage.” Krugman (1979, 1980) shows 
at gains from trade exist even if all countries are identical. Smith’s idea of specialization also 
plays an important role in endogenous growth theory. For example, in Romer (1986), 
endogenous increase in the number of intermediate inputs raises the productivity in the 
 (1991) construct a model which explains economic growth by the evolution of division 
of labor. 
Smith’s discussion of division of labor provides an exceptionally lucid analysis of 
specialization, increasing returns and gains from trade -- principles upon which many fields of 
modern economics rest. His idea of specialization is more general than Ricardo’s concept of 
comparative advantage. According to Adam Smith, even two ex ante identical individuals can 
benefit from specialization and trad
ization. For Smith, specialization causes ex post differen
tional trade literature, Grossman and Helpman (1989) distinguish the so-called “acquired 
comparative
th
production of final goods. 
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 Extending the analysis of division of labor within a firm to vertical specialization 
betwee
r to enhance the productivity 
of the economy, there is no such authority in the vertical 
relation
of vertical specialization tend to be more 
produc
 
2.4. Measurement and Data 
centration 
Following Holmes (1999), we measure geographical concentration by own-industry 
neighboring output. I define the neighbor of a firm as all the firms other than the firm itself in the 
n firms requires some caution. Division of labor within a firm looks more like a 
cooperative game, because even though workers may have their private goals, there is an 
authority that coordinates and organizes the division of labor in orde
firm as a whole. In a market 
ship between firms. Therefore, the setting of vertical specialization between firms looks 
more like a non-cooperative game. 
The following hypothesis summarizes the above discussion. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms with higher degrees 
tive. 
2.4.1. Measuring Variables 
We discussed the measurement of vertical specialization in Section 2.1. Here we explain other 
variables that will be used in the regression analysis. 
A. Extent of Market 
To test the hypothesis that firms in a larger market tend to be more vertically specialized, 
we use industry size to proxy the extent of market. This measure is also consistent with the 
model in Section 2.3. We define the industry at the four-digit level. 
B. Geographical Con
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 same c
 
 
outpu
, writing, monitoring and implementing 
ontracts. 
W ncial marketization index of 2001 complied by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2003) 
as ou
ity. Therefore, own-industry neighboring output shows the total sales of same four-digit 
industry in the same city except the firm concerned. 
C. Industry Lifecycle
Our primary measure of the lifecycle of an industry is the weighted average of ages of all 
the firms in that industry, with the weights given by firms’ share of sales. Table 2.4 shows the 10 
youngest industries and 10 oldest industries in 2002. To capture the quadratic form of industry 
age in the hypothesis, we include industry age and industry age squared in our regression. An 
alternative measure of industry lifecycle is the industry growth rate, which was first proposed by 
Tucker and Wilder (1977) and later used by Levy (1984). According to these authors, a higher 
(lower) growth rate of an industry shows that the industry is in its earlier (later) stage of the 
lifecycle. Again, the industry is defined at the four-digit level. We calculate industry growth rate 
between 1996 and 2002 using NBS Enterprise Dataset (1996) and (2002).8 The industry gross
t of 2002 is deflated by sectoral ex-factory price index (China Statistical Yearbook, 2003). 
D. Transaction Cost 
Transaction cost is difficult to measure. As Coase explains, transaction cost includes cost 
of discovering input price and costs of negotiating
c
e use provi
r measure. There are five components in this index: (1) Size of the government in the 
regional economy; (2) Economic structure, mainly concerning the growth of the non-state sector; 
(3) Interregional trade barriers; (4) Factor market development, including factor mobility; (5) 
                                                 
 Note that there is a difference in the coverage between 1996 dataset and 2002 dataset. The 1996 dataset includes 
all firms with independent accounting system. The 2002 dataset includes all state firms and all non-state firms above 
8
designated size. We assume that the difference in coverage does not vary substantially across industries. 
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 Legal framework. To construct the index, these five variables were first transformed into 0-to-10 
scale values. Then principal component analysis was used to generate the weights. The index 
shows the relative position of a province in the progress towards market economy compared to 
other provinces. According to the authors, higher index indicates better developed market 
economy. This index was used before by Zhang (2005) in a study of China’s private enterprises. 
Market transaction cost is lower if the market system is better developed. We believe the 
marketization index captures the core of the Coase’s concept of transaction cost. Figure 2.1 plots 
e marketization index and VSI of Chinese provinces. As shown by the figure, marketization 
index has a strong and positive relationship with VSI. 
 
Th
rms and all non-state firms above designated scale. Only non-
state firm  with sales under 5 million Yuan are excluded. The total number of observations in the 
manufacturing sector is 161,868. The industry section of China Statistical Yearbook (2003) is 
complied based on this dataset. China Markets Yearbook (2004) reports the basic information of 
each four-digit industry. The dataset contains detailed information of about 100 variables, 
including ID number, sales revenue, value added, export, four-digit industry code, six-digit 
geographical code (county or district level), founding year, ownership type, employment, capital 
stock, and intermediate inputs. Our data cover 527 four-digit manufacturing industries and 348 
cities across the country. Summary statistics of the variables defined in this section are reported 
in Table 2.5. 
th
2.4.2. The Data 
e empirical study is based on a large dataset of Chinese industrial firms built from cross-
sectional data collected in a regular survey by China National Bureau of Statistics in 2002. The 
survey covers all state-owned fi
s
 33
  
2.5. Empirical Tests 
2.5.1. Determinants of Vertical Specialization 
In this section, we carry out econometric tests of the hypotheses outlined in Section 2.3. 
We begin with the estimation of the determinants of VSI. On the basis of Hypotheses 1-4, we 
estimate the following equation 
AgeIndustryOutputgNeighborinSizeIndustryVSI ___ 321 ∗+∗+∗+= βββα  
,_)_( 5
2
4 ελββ ++∗+∗+ ∑
i
ii XIndexionMarketizatAgeIndustry    (2.19) 
where iX ‘s are control variables. 
The explanatory variables are characteristics of the firm’s industry, home city or home 
province, so they are unlikely to be endogenous. The upper panel of Table 2.6 reports the 
coefficients and standard errors of OLS estimation, while the lower panel shows the quantitative 
significance of the variables. The standard errors reported throughout the chapter are corrected 
for two-digit industry-province clustering. All the coefficients in specification (1) are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The positive coefficient of industry age and the negative 
coefficient of industry age squared imply an inverted U-shape relationship between VSI and 
industry age. All four hypotheses are supported by the regression results of specification (1). 
irms into four groups: state, 
collective, private, and foreign firms. In the regression, the dummy for state ownership is 
omitted. The coefficients hardly change and remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Suspecting that vertical specialization differs systematically among firms with different 
ownership, we add ownership dummies in specification (2) of Table 2.6. Based on China’s 
official categorization scheme, we divide the ownership of the f
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 The es
the absolute value of the coefficients for both 
industr
ariables is much lower. 
A one 
timation results also show that private firms have the highest degree of vertical 
specialization, followed by collectives and foreign invested firms. State firms appear to have the 
lowest degree of vertical specialization. The VSI of the private firms is, on average, 2.08 
percentage points higher than that of the state firms. 
As explained in Section 2.1, because VSI can be affected by industry-specific technology 
and the relative positions in production chain, it is critical to include two-digit industry dummies 
in the regression. To control for the huge difference between coastal regions and non-coastal 
regions, we also add a coastal dummy. The estimation results appear in specification (3) of Table 
2.6. The vertical specialization of firms in coastal regions is significantly higher than non-coastal 
regions. This specification substantially reduces 
y age and industry age squared. The most important change is that the coefficient of 
industry age squared is no longer statistically significant. 
In the last column of Table 2.6, instead of industry age, we use industry growth rate as an 
alternative measure of industry lifecycle. Industry growth rate and industry growth rate squared 
both have the expected signs, but neither is statistically significant. 
Now we turn to the quantitative significance of the variables, which indicates the 
response of the dependent variable to a one-standard-deviation increase in the corresponding 
explanatory variable. In all four cases reported in Table 2.6, provincial marketization index has 
by far the largest impact on VSI. The quantitative significance of other v
standard deviation increase in the marketization index raises VSI by about 1.7 percentage 
points. Table 2.3 shows that the gap of VSI between coastal and non-coastal regions is 8.1 
percentage points in 2000. If the marketization index jumps from the average of non-coastal 
regions (4.46) to the average of coastal regions (6.73), VSI would increase by (6.73-
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 4.46)×1.35=3.12 percentage points, which accounts for about 40 percent of the gap of VSI 
between coastal and non-coastal regions in 2000. 
In Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, our objective is to see whether these results are robust to 
different definitions of industry and region. Most of the firms in our dataset have multiple 
products. Since each firm reports only one four-digit industry code, it is possible that when we 
measure the extent of market, four-digit industry is too narrow. In specifications (1) and (2) of 
Table 2.7, we estimate (2.19) with three-digit industry size and two-digit industry size. The 
coefficients of both of them are positive and statistically significant. Similarly, the extent of 
market for some firms goes beyond the national border. To take international markets into 
consideration, we include three-digit and four-digit industry exports in the regression. The last 
two columns of Table 2.7 show estimates similar to our baseline results. 
In the first two columns of Table 2.8, we replace four-digit industry age and growth rate 
with three-digit industry age and growth rate. None of the coefficients of these variables are 
statistically significant. In fact, we obtain an unexpected positive sign for industry age squared in 
the firs
oring output are still positive and statistically significant. 
In Table 2.9, we conduct two more robustness 
tend to be more vertically specialized (Tucker and Wilder, 1977). In the baseline specification, 
we add
t column. In addition, we redefine neighboring output at three-digit industry-city and 
three-digit industry-county level. As shown by the last two columns of Table 2.8, the estimated 
coefficients of neighb
checks. It is possible that smaller firms 
 the firm size as an independent variable. The results reported in the first column shows 
that this is true for Chinese firms. Given that the main purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
the effects of market forces and globalization forces on firm-level performance, we are interested 
in the impact of globalization on vertical specialization. In particular, we would like to know if 
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 the entry of foreign firms increases the vertical specialization in their industries. For example, 
when foreign car markers built assembly plants in China, they often purchased parts locally, 
helping create many specialized auto parts suppliers.  In the regression, we use the share of FDI 
in industry output as a proxy for the presence of foreign firms. The second column of Table 2.9 
shows that FDI did have a positive effect on vertical specialization, but its quantitative effect is 
relatively small. 
Given that VSI is defined to be bounded between 0 and 1, it may not be appropriate to use 
VSI as a dependent variable. We reestimate (2.19) using logistic transformation of VSI as the 
dependent variable: 
.
1
ln ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−= VSI
VSILOGITVSI       (2.20) 
T 0 show a similar pattern. In the first two 
ate is included as a measure of industry lifecycle, the coefficient of 
tative significance of 
9
In summary, we find evidence that supports Smith’s extent-of-market theory, Marshall’s 
input sharing theory and Coase’s transaction cost theory. Our data do not support Stigler’s 
industry lifecycle theory because the results obtained in specification (1) of Table 2.6 and Table 
2.10 are not robust to the inclusion of industry dummies and coastal dummy. Perhaps the 
relationship between industry lifecycle and vertical specialization is more complicated than a 
                                                
he estimation results reported in Table 2.1
specifications, the coefficients of all the variables of interest show expected signs and are 
statistically significant. When industry and coastal dummies are added into specification (3), the 
coefficient of industry age squared is no longer statistically significant. In specification (4), 
where industry growth r
industry growth rate squared is not significant. Again, the quanti
marketization index is much larger than all other variables.
 
9 I also did the robustness checks for LOGITVSI. The results are available upon request. 
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 simple 
l Specialization and Productivity 
This su
inverted-U relationship. Indeed, the evolution of some industries, including computers 
(Fine, 1998) and semiconductors (Langlois, 2000), exhibits successive cycles of integration and 
specialization. 
 
2.5.2. Vertica
bsection tests the hypothesis that other things being equal, more vertically specialized 
firms tend to be more productive. Following Murakami, Liu and Otsuka (1996), we estimate a 
production function that includes VSI as an explanatory variable. Specifically, we assume the 
Cobb-Douglas form of10
    { }.exp )(VSIcMLKY ∑++= θµγβα ,iiZ      (2.21) 
where Y
Taking logarithm, we obtain the following estimable equation: 
 is sales, K is capital stock, L is total employment, M is intermediate inputs, and Z ’s are 
control variables. 
i
.)(lnlnlnln εθµγβα ++++++= ∑ i
i
i
We begin our analysis by regressing lnY on lnK, lnL, lnM and VSI using OLS. The 
estimation results are reported in the first column of Table 2.11. The coefficient of VSI is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, the quantitative significance is 
relatively low. The output increases by only 0.36 percent in response to a one-standard-deviation 
increase in V
ZVSIMLKcY     (2.22) 
SI. 
                                                
It is well known that ownership has a strong impact on firm-level productivity (see, for 
example, Jefferson, Rawski, Wang and Zheng (2000) for Chinese industry). Thus, we include 
ownership dummies in specification (2) of Table 2.11. The coefficient of VSI is now smaller but 
 
10 I also estimated translog form of production function. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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 still significant at the 10 percent level. In specification (3), VSI is not statistically significant after 
we add two-digit industry dummies and province dummies. 
By definition, VSI is a function of Y, so it is clearly an endogenous variable in (2.22). 
Instrumental variable (IV) method is needed to obtain unbiased estimates. 
Independent variables in (2.19) are natural candidates for instrumental variables. A 
preliminary examination of these variables indicates that marketization index, neighboring 
output, industry age are unlikely to be exogenous in (2.22). Since marketization index correlates 
with the quality of the institutions, it may have a direct effect on firm’s productivity. 
Neighb
 (1), the second-stage regression results show that the coefficient of VSI is 
signific
about 1.6 
percent increase in output. An increase of 8.1 percentage points in VSI, which is the gap between 
coastal and non-coastal regions in 2000, would imply 0.8 percent higher output after controlling 
for inputs. 
oring output correlates with geographic concentration of an industry, which may affect 
firm-level productivity through externalities such as labor pooling and knowledge spillovers. 
Regarding the industry age, old industries may exhibit lower productivity if they use outdated 
technology. 
However, no theory indicates that industry size should be a determinant of a firm’s 
productivity. Therefore, we use four-digit industry size as an excluded instrument to estimate 
(2.22). Panel A of Table 2.12 reports the estimation results of second-stage regression. For 
specification
ant at the 1 percent level. Compared with OLS, the coefficient is much larger. We add 
ownership dummies, two-digit industry dummies and province dummies in specification (2). In 
this case, the coefficient of VSI is smaller than specification (1) but still statistically and 
quantitatively significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in VSI is associated with 
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 As a robustness check, in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2.12, we replace four-digit 
dustry size with three-digit industry size as an instrumental variable. The results are almost 
entical to the baseline estimates. In specifications (5) and (6), we use both four-digit industry 
ze and three-digit industry size. Again, the estimates change very little. The Sargan test of 
ecifications (5) and (6) reported at the bottom of Panel A does not reject the null hypothesis of 
rthogonality of the IV residuals to the instruments. Subject to the caveats related to the power of 
e overidentification tests, this gives us additional confidence that industry size is a valid 
strument. 
Panel d (6), the F-
statistics for joint significance of four-digit industry size and three-digit industry size are 23.02 
and 17.85 respectively. In all six specifications, the excluded instruments are all significant at the 
1 percent level, which serves to indicate the strength of these variables as instruments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
in
id
si
sp
o
th
in
 B of Table 2.12 reports first-stage estimates.11 For specifications (5) an
                                      
11 In fac nd 
Baker, 1 us variable, a 
first stag  F-statistic below 10 is cause for concern (Staiger and Stock, 1997). In a recent study, Stock and Yogo 
004) refine this rule and replace it with simulated critical values. Our first stage F-statistics far exceed the critical 
values at the 5 percent level reported in Stock and Yogo (2004), so we conclude that our instruments are not weak. 
t if the instruments are weak, even very large samples can yield unreliable estimates (Bound, Jaeger, a
995). To test whether instruments are weak, one rule of thumb is that for a single endogeno
e
(2
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 Figure 2.1  Vertical Specialization Index versus Provincial Marketization Index 
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 Table 2.1 lution of Vertical Specialization ina’s Industry (1949-2003) 
 
VSI = 1 – Valu /Gross Output  
   Evo  of Ch
 e Added
2003 0.710 
2002 0.702 
2001 0.703 
1994 0.714 
1993 0.677 
1992 0.724 
 VSI = 1 – Net Value/Gross Output  
1992 0.731 
1989 0.717 
1988 0.703 
1987 0.692 
1986 0.680 
1985 0.675 
1984 0.670 
1983 0.669 
0 
2 
9 
1 
1 
0 
1960 0.655 
1955 0.665 
1950 0.686 
1949 0.679 
2000 0.704 
1999 0.703 
1998 0.713 
1997 0.710 
1996 0.713 
1995 0.719 
1991 0.732 
1990 0.724 
1982 0.665 
1981 0.659 
1980 0.65
1979 0.65
1978 0.64
1975 0.64
1970 0.62
1965 0.64
 
a’s statistical system switched from net v  valu d in 1 alue = net 
ion   (China National ical Bureau, 1992). Figures of 1949-1997 include all 
ting system. Figures of 1998-2001 include all state firms and all non-
ed size. 
culation  on China Industrial Economy ok (1
lculation  on C atistic rbook ). 
uthor’s calculation  on C atistic rbook . 
 
 
 
 
      
Notes: Chin alue to e adde 992. V added 
Value + depreciat  Statist
firms with independent accoun
state firms above designat
Sources: 1949-1991 Author’s cal  based Yearbo 992). 
                   1992-2002 Author’s ca  based hina St al Yea  (2003
                            2003 A  based hina St al Yea  (2004)
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 Table 2.2   Evolution of Vertic ali  by I  (1 00) 
 
 
al Speci zation ndustry 980-20
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Nation 0.626 0.653 0.691 0.726 0.703 
      
Coal Mining & Processing 0.484 0.480 0.551 0.491 0.543 
P .343 0.326 0.454 0.349 0.294 
F
N 0.577 0.658 0.655 
Non
L 0.377 0.541 0.492 
Food Pr 821 0.847 0.758 
Beverage Production 0.626 0.643 0.669 0.701 0.647 
Tobacco Processing 0.332 0.361 0.411 0.404 0.355 
Textile 0.705 0.746 0.762 0.811 0.753 
Garments & Other Fiber Products 0.751 0.701 0.739 0.771 0.742 
Timber Processing 0.760 
Furniture Manufacturing 0.634 0.659 0.705 0.768 0.744 
Papermaking & Paper Products 0.662 0.678 0.730 0.777 0.741 
Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 0.596 0.697 0.690 0.761 0.749 
Petroleum Processing, Coking Products, & Gas  0.576 0.564 0.708 0.725 0.822 
Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 0.658 0.667 0.698 0.757 0.754 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 0.663 0.692 0.715 0.728 0.644 
Chemical Fibers 0.590 0.617 0.675 0.751 0.762 
Rubber Products 0.618 0.647 0.712 0.779 0.731 
Plastic Products 0.532 0.706 0.730 0.806 0.756 
Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.558 0.572 0.645 0.716 0.695 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.656 0.650 0.724 0.714 0.725 
Smelting & Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals 0.733 0.737 0.781 0.783 0.765 
Metal Products 0.630 0.652 0.704 0.776 0.760 
Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 0.594 0.621 0.675 0.734 0.729 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.652 0.649 0.705 0.763 0.753 
Electric Equipment & Machinery 0.640 0.665 0.713 0.770 0.745 
Electronic & Telecommunications 0.619 0.663 0.725 0.751 0.758 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Office Equipment 0.523 0.542 0.596 0.716 0.753 
Electric Power, Steam & Hot Water  0.338 0.385 0.539 0.505 0.495 
etroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 0
errous Metals Mining & Processing 0.474 0.443 0.578 0.645 0.622 
on-Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 0.497 0.478 
metal Minerals Mining & Processing 0.397 0.418 0.587 0.655 0.656 
ogging & Transport of Timber & Bamboo 0.393 0.356 
ocessing & Production 0.848 0.834 0.
, Bamboo, Cane &Palm  0.668 0.685 0.733 0.786 
 
 Note:  Vertical Specialization is defined in Section 2.1. 
Sources:  1980 and 1985  Author’s calculation based on  Industry Volume, The Data of Industrial Census of People’s  Republic of 
China in 1985. 
                  1990  Author’s calculation based on  China Statistical Yearbook (1991). 
              1995 Author’s calculation based on Industry Volume, The Data of Third National Industrial Census of People’s 
Republic of China in 1995. 
                  2000  Author’s calculation based on  China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
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 Table 2.3   Evolution of Vertical Specialization by Region (1980-2000) 
 
Guangdong. In t d Chongqing are included in Guangdong and Sichuan, respectively. 
ensus of People’s Republic 
of China in 1985. 
                 1990, 1995 and 2000 Author’s calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (2001). 
 
 
Rank of 
2000 ion 
 
 
Reg 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
1 Zhejiang 0.663 0.684 0.727 0.773 0.764 
2 Tianjin 0.664 0.681 0.723 0.732 0.758 
3 Jiangsu 0.701 0.711 0.751 0.764 0.751 
4 Shanghai 0.617 0.648 0.714 0.726 0.728 
5 Guangdong 0.660 0.679 0.701 0.756 0.726 
6 Liaoning 
i 
ia 
ang 
n 
29 T
0.634 0.639 0.686 0.723 0.719 
7 Beijing 0.615 0.636 0.683 0.683 0.718 
8 Jiangxi 0.676 0.683 0.709 0.746 0.711 
9 Gansu 
Jilin 
0.618 0.634 0.644 0.659 0.709 
10 0.676 0.667 0.674 0.696 0.705 
11 Fujian 0.660 0.690 0.687 0.737 0.695 
12 Anhui 0.677 0.690 0.714 0.742 0.695 
13 Shandong 0.665 0.647 0.713 0.716 0.693 
14 Ningxia 0.629 0.652 0.649 0.696 0.692 
15 Sichuan 
Henan 
0.649 0.662 0.673 0.722 0.681 
16 0.661 0.669 0.679 0.692 0.681 
17 Guangx 0.662 0.669 0.667 0.707 0.677 
18 Hunan 0.669 0.666 0.679 0.708 0.676 
19 Hubei 0.685 0.682 0.703 0.721 0.670 
20 Hebei 
21 
0.637 
0.676 
0.675 0.705 
0.647 
0.687 
0.657 
0.669 
0.667 Qinghai 0.625 
22 Guizhou 0.621 0.629 0.600 0.630 0.656 
23 Shaanxi 0.670 0.676 0.671 0.687 0.653 
24 Shanxi 0.621 0.650 0.642 0.647 0.648 
25 Inner Mongol
Xinjiang 
0.669 0.664 0.641 0.653 0.627 
26 0.623 0.623 0.635 0.629 0.581 
27 Heilongji 0.559 0.625 0.586 0.590 0.507 
28 Yunna 0.627 0.613 0.549 0.524 0.500 
ibet 
 
0.666 
 
0.
 
693 0.468 0.474 
 
0.437 
  
 Coast 
 
 0.652 0.669 0.709 0.730 0.722 
 Non-coast  0.649 0.658 0.642 0.662 0.641 
Notes: Coastal regions include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and 
his table, Hainan an
     Sources: 1980 and 1985 Author’s calculation based on  Region Volume, The Data of Industrial C
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 Table 2.4   China’s Ten Youngest and Oldest Industries in 2002 
 
    
y. The weights are firms’ sales shares.  
           Source: Author’s calculation based on NBS Enterprise Dataset (2002).  
  
Industry Code Age (unit: year) Industry 
Youngest Industries 
4181 Communication Equipment Repairs 
 
ent Fertilizer 
Instruments Repairs 
1353 reserved Aquatic Products 6.31
   
dustries 
l Carriers 
ment 
ic and Film Equipment 
 
 
4092 Industrial Electric Furnaces 37.04 
2.99 
1443 Citrid Acid 4.48 
1441 Amino Acid 5.15 
4141 Computers 5.46 
1912 Heavy Leather 5.61 
2625 Trace Elem 5.65 
3724 Mini-cars 5.80 
3685 Medical Apparatus and 5.84 
4173 Electronic Calculators 6.25 
P  
Oldest In
3712 Passenger Rai 71.28 
3711 Locomotives 68.48 
3761 Ocean Shipping Vessels 56.47 
3716 Special Railway Equip 55.74 
3713 Railway Freight Cars 51.15 
4251 Photograph 50.00 
1620 Cigarettes 43.42 
3781 Railroad Equipment Repairing 41.70 
3512 Internal Combustion Engines 39.50 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Industry age = weighted average of ages of all firms in that industr
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 Table 2.5   Summary Statistics of the Variables 
 
Std. Mini Max Mean Dev. mum imum 
VSI (percent) 6 1 99.43 5.88 0.01 9.95 
Four-digit Industry Size (100 billion Yuan) 0.53 0.70 0.0005 4.00 
Three-digit Industry Size (100 billion Yuan) 0.0011 5.66 
0.2 1
Neighboring Output: Three-digit industry-County (billion 
1 7
year2) 0.009 5.08 
1 3
ween 1996 and 2002) 
0.0 3130.4 
ween 1996 and 2002) 
te)2 0.0018 601.7 
 
 Yuan) 4 0.00
 3 0.00 3894.3 
Share of FDI in Industrial Output 0.21 0.16 0 0.98 
1.04 1.06 
Two-digit Industry Size (100 billion Yuan) 4.07 2.39 5 0.96 
Four-digit Industry Exports (100 billion Yuan) 0.14 0.31 0 1.35 
Three-digit Industry Exports (100 billion Yuan) 0.29 0.56 0 1.89 
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry-City (billion Yuan) 1.47 3.62 0 55.8 
Neighboring Output: Three-digit industry-City (billion 
Yuan) 2.61 6.53 0 93.8 
Yuan) 0.72 2.63 0 85.7 
Four-digit Industry Age (year) 3.16 5.85 2.99 1.28 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 (1000 0.21 0.24 
Three-digit Industry Age (year) 2.61 3.43 6.58 4.28 
(Three-digit Industry Age)2 (1000 year2) 0.17 0.11 0.04 1.18 
Four-digit Industry Growth Rate (bet 1.45 1.43 -0.85 55.97 
(Four-digit Industry Growth Rate)2 4.14 47.9 00045 
Three-digit Industry Growth Rate (bet 1.39 1.24 -0.42 24.53 
(Three-digit Industry Growth Ra 3.36 22.3 
Provincial Marketization Index 6.52 1.26 1.81 8.56 
Value Added (million Yuan) 16.2 130.5 0.001 1664.5 
Sales Revenue (million 57.9 32.0 2 4825.3 
Employment (person) 283 997 2 137962 
Capital (million Yuan) 67.4 524.4 0.003 6821.5 
Intermediate Inputs (million Yuan) 42.4 40.5 1 
 
Note: All variables are defined in Section 2.4. 
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 Table 2.6   De ecialization 
Dependent variable: VSI 
 
ion 
terminants of Vertical Sp
Specificat (1) VSI 
(2) 
VSI 
(3) 
VSI 
(4) 
VSI 
Four-digit Industry Size 0.50*** (0.11) 
0.48*** 
(0.10) 
0.55*** 
(0.11) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry- 0.095*** 
(0  
0
-2.06*** 
(0  
-2.02*** 
(0  
-0.38 
(0  
e)2
n Index 1.97*** (0.06) 
ip 
0.57*** 
(  
0.41** 0.52*** 
try Dummies 
ast Dummy 2.43*** 
2.44**
R2 0.0553 0.0569 
Quantitative Significance 
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry- 0  
-0 9 -0 8 -0 9 
e)2
Provincial Marketization Index 2.48 2.37 1.69 1.71 
City 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) .02)
Four-digit Industry Age 0.19*** (0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
.08*** 
(0.03)  
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 .72) .66) .28)  
Four-digit Industry Growth Rate    0.14 (0.09) 
(Four-digit Industry Growth Rat    -0.0022 (0  .0019)
Provincial Marketizatio 1.88*** (0.07) 
1.34*** 
(0.09) 
1.36*** 
(0.10) 
Collective Ownersh  0.87*** (0.11) 
0.62*** 
(0.10) 
0.66*** 
(0.10) 
Private Ownership  2.08*** (0.10) 
1.65*** 
(0.10) 
1.73*** 
(0.10) 
Foreign Ownership  0.21) (0.19) (0.19) 
Two-digit Indus No No Yes Yes 
Co No No (0.26) 
* 
(0.26) 
0.0319 0.0346 
Four-digit Industry Size 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.31 
City 0.40 0.40 0.43 .34
Four-digit Industry Age 1.11 1.05 0.47  
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 .4 .4 .0  
Four-digit Industry Growth Rate    0.20 
(Four-digit Industry Growth Rat    -0.11 
 
el. ** 
denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. 
Quantitative significance indicates the response of the dependent variable implied by the point estimate of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the corresponding explanatory variable. In regressions with ownership 
dummies, the dummy for state ownership is omitted. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 lev
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 Table 2.7   Determinants n: Robustness Checks I 
Dependent variable: VSI 
 
n (2) VSI 
(3) 
VSI 
(
VSI 
 of Vertical Specializatio
Specificatio (1) VSI 
4) 
Three-digit Industry Size 0.21** (0  .09)   
 
Two-digit Industry Size  0.29*** (0  
0.93* 
(0  
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry- 0  0  0  
0  
n Index 1.35*** 1.26*** 1.34*** 
1.34*** 
try Dummies 
ast Dummy 
R2 0.0571 0.0570 
Quantitative Significance 
0.13 
0.69 
0.29 
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry-
Provincial Marketization Index 1.70 1.59 1.69 1.69 
.04)  
 
Four-digit Industry Exports   .55)
 
Three-digit Industry Exports    
0.59* 
(0.35) 
City 
.10***
(0.036) 
0.10** 
(0.039) 
.12***
(0.040) 
.11***
(0.039) 
Four-digit Industry Age 0.058 (0.046) 
.180***
(0.050) 
0.039 
(0.047) 
0.045 
(0.044) 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 -0.32 (1.03) 
-1.62 
(1.13) 
0.23 
(2.30) 
0.19 
(1.19) 
Provincial Marketizatio (0.10) (0.19)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Ownership Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Two-digit Indus Yes No Yes Yes 
Co Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0.0568 0.0389 
Three-digit Industry Size    
Two-digit Industry Size    
Four-digit Industry Exports    
Three-digit Industry Exports    0.33 
City 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.40 
Four-digit Industry Age 0.34 1.05 0.29 0.26 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 -0.08 -0.39 0.05 0.05 
 
* denotes statistical significance at the .05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 
level. 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. 
Quantitative significance indicates the response of the dependent variable implied by the point estimate of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the corresponding explanatory variable. * denotes statistical significance at 
the 0.10 level. *  0
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 Table 2.8   Determinants : Robustness Checks II 
Dependent variable: VSI 
 
ion VSI VSI VSI 
 of Vertical Specialization
Specificat (1) VSI 
(2) (3) (4) 
Three-digit Industry Age 0.14 (0.13)    
(Three-digit Industry Age)2 0.58 (0  
2 -0.0025 
(0.0024) 
-0.86 
(0  
0.044* 
(0.023) 
Neighboring Output: Three-digit industry- 0.065** 
(0.027) 
r-digit industry-City 
arketization Index 1.35*** 1.37*** 1.35*** 1.36*** 
R2 72 0.0543 0.0551 
Quant  Significance 
0  
2 -0 6 
-0 1 
0.29 
.35)    
Three-digit Industry Growth Rate  0.12 (0.08)   
(Three-digit Industry Growth Rate)    
Four-digit Industry Age   0.087* (0.048) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2   -0.80 (1.05) .85)
Neighboring Output: Three-digit industry-City    
County    
Neighboring Output: Fou 0.092** (  0.038)
0.093*** 
(  0.026)   
Four-digit Industry Size 0.40** (0.20) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
0.62*** 
(0.20) 
0.53*** 
(0.17) 
Provincial M (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
0.0569 0.05
itative
Three-digit Industry Age 0.48    
(Three-digit Industry Age)2 .63    
Three-digit Industry Growth Rate  0.15   
(Three-digit Industry Growth Rate)  .0   
Four-digit Industry Age   0.51 0.76 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2   -0.19 .2
Neighboring Output: Three-digit industry-City    
Neighboring Output: Three-digit industry-
County    0.17 
r-digit industry-City 
Provincial Marketization Index 1.70 1.73 1.70 1.72 
Neighboring Output: Fou 0.33 0.34   
Four-digit Industry Size 0.28 0.29 0.43 0.37 
 
0.10 level. ** denotes statistical 
 level. *** denotes statistical sign cance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Notes: All regressions include ownership dummies, two-digit industry dummies and coast dummy. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. Quantitative significance 
indicates the response of the dependent variable implied by the point estimate of a one-standard-deviation increase 
 the corresponding explanatory variable. * denotes statistical significance at the in
significance at the 0.05 ifi
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 Table 2.9   Determinants : Robustness Checks III 
Dependent v riable: VSI 
 
 VSI 
of Vertical Specialization
a
 
(1) 
VSI 
(2) 
Firm Size -0.0013*** (0.0002)  
Share of FDI in Industry Output  
0.26** 
(0.1226) 
Four-digit Industry Size 0.51*** (0.0979) 
0.32*** 
(0.0997) 
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry-City 
0  0  
arketization Index 1.41*** 1.31*** 
R2 0.0575 
Quantitative Sign ce 
-0.56 
r-digit industry-City 
Provincial Marketization Index 1.78 1.65 
0.13*** 
(0.0360) 
0.15*** 
(0.0519) 
Four-digit Industry Age .074***(0.0254) 
.082***
(0.0295) 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 -0.42 (0.3684) 
-0.44 
(0.2667) 
Provincial M (0.0862) (0.0835) 
0.0778 
ifican
Firm Size  
Share of FDI in Industry Output  0.04 
Four-digit Industry Size 0.36 0.22 
Neighboring Output: Fou 0.47 0.54 
Four-digit Industry Age 0.43 0.48 
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 -0.09 -0.11 
 
0 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 
0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 vel. 
 
Notes: All regressions include ownership dummies, two-digit industry dummies and coast dummy. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. Quantitative significance 
indicates the response of the dependent variable implied by the point estimate of a one-standard-deviation increase 
in the corresponding explanatory variable. In regressions with ownership dummies, the dummy for state 
ownership is omitted. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.1
 le
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 Table 2.10 ation 
Dependent variable: LOGITVSI 
 
ion LOGITVSI LOGITVSI LOGITVSI LOGITVSI 
   Determinants of Vertical Specializ
Specificat (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Four-digit Industry Size 0.024* (0.013) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
Neighboring Output: Four-digit industry- 0.0065*** 
(0.0022) 
0  0  
(  
0  
(  
-0.13* 
(0  
-0.12 
(0  
-0.05 
(0  
)2
n Index 0.088*** (0.005) 
0  0  0  
ip 
0  
0.026** 
(0 ) 
0.016* 
(  
0.024** 
(  
try Dummies 
ast Dummy 0.17*** 0.16*** 
R2 0.0436 0.0434 
Quantitative Significance 
Neighboring Output: four-digit industry- 0.0235 
-0.0320 -0.0296 -0. 00 
)2
Provincial Marketization Index 0.1109 0.1061 0.1121 0.0644 
City 
0.0074*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0073*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0025) 
Four-digit Industry Age .010***(0  .0025)
.010***
0.0028)
.0065**
0.0033)  
(Four-digit Industry Age)2 .07) .07) .05)  
four-digit Industry Growth Rate    0.092* (0.053) 
(four-digit Industry Growth Rate    -0.17 (0.10) 
Provincial Marketizatio .084***(0.005) 
.051***
(0.006) 
.051***
(0.006) 
Collective Ownersh  0.011 (0.010) 
0.0026 
(  0.0867)
0.0026 
(  0.0087)
Private Ownership  0.069*** (0.009) 
.049***
(0.008) 
0.053*** 
(0.008) 
Foreign Ownership  .011 0.009) 0.010)
Two-digit Indus No No Yes Yes 
Co No No (0.02) (0.02) 
0.0210 0.0219 
four-digit Industry Size 0.0168 0.0154 0.0196 0.0154 
City 0.0268 0.0264 0.0279 
four-digit Industry Age 0.0591 0.0585 0.0380  
(four-digit Industry Age)2 01  
four-digit Industry Growth Rate    0.0001 
(four-digit Industry Growth Rate    0.0000 
 
tes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
Notes: LOGITVSI is defined as LOGITVSI = ln [VSI/(1-VSI)]. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
corrected for Two-digit industry-province clustering. Quantitative significance indicates the response of the 
dependent variable implied by the point estimate of a one-standard-deviation increase in the corresponding 
explanatory variable. In regressions with ownership dummies, the dummy for state ownership is omitted. * 
denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** deno
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 Table 2.11   Vertical Sp vity: OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: lnY 
 
Specification 
ecialization and Producti
(1) 
lnY 
(2) 
lnY 
(3) 
lnY 
VSI 0.00023** 0.00019* 0.00016 (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00011) 
lnK 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 
lnL 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 
lnM 0.873*** (0.003) 
0.867*** 0.859*** 
Collective Ownership  0.035*** 0.043*** 
Private Ownership  0.044*** 0.050*** 
Foreign Ownership  0.088*** (0  
0.075*** 
(0  
Two-digit Industry Dummies No No Yes 
Province Dummies No No Yes 
R2 0.9409 0.9413 0.9425 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
(0.004) (0.005) 
(0.008) (0.012) 
(0.011) (0.013) 
.017) .019)
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. * 
denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. In regressions with ownership dummies, the dummy for 
state ownership is omitted. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 2.12   Vertical Specializatio and Productivity: IV Estimation 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
n 
 
Pa nd-S essi den : lnYnel A: Seco tage Regr on     Depen t Variable  
VSI 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
0.101*** 0.050*** 0.097*** 0.048*** 0.100*** 0.049*** 
0.078*** 0.034*** 0.073*** 0.032*** 0.077*** 0.032** 
lnM 0.801*** (0 ) 
0.928*** 
(  
0.810*** 
(0 ) 
0.933*** 
(  
0.805*** 
(0 ) 
0.930*** 
(  
s No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Two-digit Industry 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
P-Value of Sargan test     0.4583 0.3985 
Pa rst-St ssion dent  VSI 
-1.61*** -1.22*** -1.63*** -1.21*** -1.63*** -1.22*** 
lnL 
lnM 4.21*** (0  
3.53*** 
(0  
0.55*** 
(0  
0.27*** 
(0  
0.34*** 
(  
0.22*** 
(  
0.17*** 
(  
0.13*** 
(  
s 
Two-digit Industry No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Province Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.0697 0.1184 0.0696 0.1184 0.0697 0.1185 
*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
lnK (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
lnL (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) 
.033 0.048) .030 0.046) .030 0.048)
Ownership Dummie
No Yes No Yes No Yes Dummies 
Province Dummies 
nel B: Fi age Regre      Depen Variable:
lnK (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
-2.74*** 
(0.05) 
-2.21*** 
(0.05) 
-2.64*** 
(0.05) 
-2.24*** 
(0.06) 
2.71*** 
(0.05) 
-2.25*** 
(0.06) 
4.22*** 
(0.04) 
3.46*** 
(0.04) .04) .05)
4.19*** 
(0.04) 
3.56*** 
(0.05) 
four-digit Industry Size .06) .05)   
0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
Three-digit Industry Size   0.04) 0.05) 0.04) 0.04)
Ownership Dummie No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Dummies 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. * denotes 
statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 53
  
 
 
3. DO DOMESTIC FIRMS BENEFIT FROM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT? 
THE CASE OF CHINA 
 
3.1. Overview of FDI Spillover Channels 
3.1.1. Horizontal Spillovers 
Horizontal spillovers of FDI take place when the presence of FDI increases the productivity of 
the domestic firms in the same industry. Teece (1977) argues that such spillovers can occur 
through various channels. The first channel is the demonstration effect. Domestic firms may be 
able to reduce the innovation costs simply by observing and imitating the foreign firms. The 
second channel is labor turnover. Workers employed and trained by foreign firms may join 
domestic firms or create their own firms. The third channel is the competition effect. The entry 
of foreign firms can force domestic firms to restructure and improve their production techniques 
and management. 
However, the increased intensity of competition may hurt domestic firms at least in the 
short run by reducing their market share and output. As shown by Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
the productivity of domestic firms would fall if they have to spread their fixed costs over smaller 
sales volume. This is usually interpreted as a crowding-out effect. The entry of foreign firms may 
also raise labor costs of domestic firms. Since foreign firms often pay higher wages, they may 
raise wages for all firms in competitive labor markets (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996). 
Theoretically, the net horizontal effect of FDI on domestic firms is inconclusive. 
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 There are two generations of empirical studies on horizontal effects. The first generation 
is characterized by industry-level studies. A partial list includes Caves (1974) for Australia, 
Globerman (1979) for Canada, and Blomstrom and Persson (1983) for Mexico. Most of the first 
generation studies find a positive correlation between FDI and industry productivity. Since they 
rely on cross-sectional data, it is difficult to distinguish whether FDI actually increases domestic 
firms’ productivity, or whether foreign investors are simply attracted to high-productivity 
industries. 
The second generation of empirical studies is based on firm-level panel data. The 
advantage of the panel data approach is that it can control for foreign investor selection bias. 
These studies examine whether foreign presence increases the productivity of the firms in the 
same industry. The results, however, have been mixed. In a study of Venezuelan factories, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) find net negative benefits to domestic firms, a result that they 
attribute to the crowding-out effect. Other studies that find negative spillovers include Haddad 
and Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic, 
Konings (2001) for Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, and Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania. In 
contrast, studies on developed countries often find evidence of positive spillovers. They include 
Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2002) for the United Kingdom, Keller and Yeaple (2003) for the 
United States, Castellani and Zanfei (2002) for Italy, and Gorg and Strobl (2003) for Ireland. 
In the case of China, Cheung and Lin (2003) find positive effects of FDI in China on the 
number of patents by using a provincial panel dataset. Based on 1995 industrial census data in 
China, Tong and Hu (2003) find significant horizontal spillovers from FDI. 
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 3.1.2. Vertical Spillovers 
Backward spillovers of FDI refer to the technology transfer through supply chains from 
foreign firms to domestic suppliers. If foreign firms are successful at preventing the leakage of 
their firm-specific knowledge to domestic competitors in the same industry, there is no scope for 
intra-industry technology spillovers. It is possible, however, that foreign firms voluntarily or 
involuntarily help increase efficiency of domestic suppliers through backward linkages. Foreign 
firms can provide technical assistance, training and other help to their domestic suppliers in order 
to improve the quality of intermediate purchases. 
Similarly, forward spillovers occur when domestic firms gain access to new or less costly 
intermediate inputs as a result of the foreign investment in upstream industries. 
Evidence of technology transfer through vertical supply chains is well documented in 
case studies. For example, Kenney and Florida (1993) and Macduffie and Helper (1997) provide 
a rich description of technology transfer to U.S. parts suppliers following the entry of Japanese 
car makers. Blalock (2002) analyzes Indonesian firms and Javorcik (2004) studies a panel dataset 
from Lithuanian industries, both of which find positive FDI spillovers through backward 
linkages. Using both industry level and firm level data, Liu and Lin (2004) find evidence of 
backward spillovers in China. 
 
3.1.3. Local Spillovers 
Given that labor turnover and demonstration effect are among the most important channels for 
technology spillovers, there are good reasons to expect that any benefits to the domestic firms 
from foreign investment would be received primarily by the firms located nearby: (1) if a skilled 
worker leaves a foreign firm to work for a domestic firm, he or she is likely to choose a firm in 
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 the same region; (2) if a new technology or a new management technique is introduced by a 
foreign firm, the domestic firms located close to it have an advantage over more distant firms in 
observing and imitating the foreign firm. Of course, domestic firms that are closer to foreign 
firms may also suffer more from the competition. 
Note that if the workers’ skills, new technologies and management techniques are 
transferable across industries, local spillovers may still occur even without direct horizontal or 
vertical linkages between domestic and foreign firms. 
In the case of China, the entry of FDI can facilitate the institutional changes and the 
improvements in the legal system. Thus, a region with a longer history of FDI tends to have 
better business environment. All these factors may contribute to improving the productivity of 
local firms. 
The geographic dimension of FDI spillovers has been investigated in a number of 
empirical studies. Using cross-sectional data for Indonesia, Sjoholm (1999) finds no evidence for 
local spillovers. Aitken and Harrison (1999) also fail to find positive spillovers from the foreign 
firms to nearby domestic firms in Venezuela. From firm-level panel data, Girma and Wakelin 
(2002) find evidence for positive spillovers from FDI in the same region and same industry in 
United Kingdom. 
 
3.2. Foreign Direct Investment in China 
For the past 25 years, China has aggressively pursued policies that encourage FDI inflow. 
For example, China developed the first law governing foreign investment in 1979, while the first 
laws relevant to domestic firms were not enacted until 1988. 
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 According to Chinese laws, foreign firms can invest in China through joint ventures, 
cooperative enterprises, and solely owned enterprises. The establishment of solely foreign-owned 
enterprises was subject to strict restrictions from Chinese government, such as export volume 
and local procurement. These restrictions were removed in 2001 in accordance with WTO 
framework. Consequently, solely foreign-owned enterprises became the most popular form of 
FDI in post-WTO China. 
Hong Kong is the most important source of FDI in China. In 2003, Hong Kong invested 
17.7 billion dollars in China, accounting for 33 percent of the total.12 Other sources of FDI 
include Japan, United States, South Korea, Taiwan and Virgin Islands.13 In recent years, an 
increasing share of FDI came from global giants in industrialized countries such as Motorola, 
SONY and Siemens. 
Nearly 70 percent of FDI in China was poured into the manufacturing sector. This is 
mainly due to the competitive edge of relatively low production cost in China for manufacturing. 
The other reason is that FDI in service sector has not been fully liberalized. 
The geographic distribution of FDI has been quite uneven. China initiated its “open door” 
policy by establishing four special economic zones in 1980. In 1984, it further opened 14 coastal 
cities. Then in the early 1990s, China expanded its open regions from the coastal cities to the 
inland regions and from the east to the west. Due to their convenient location, better 
infrastructure and legal environment, the coastal regions have been the main recipients of FDI in 
China. For example, in 2003, the coastal provinces received 88 percent of the total FDI in China. 
                                                 
12 Part of the investment from Hong Kong is originated from Chinese firms who register in Hong Kong and re-enter 
China as “foreign investment.” This is often called “round-tripping.” 
13 Many foreign firms, especially those from Taiwan and Hong Kong, invest in China via such international tax 
havens as Virgin Islands. 
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 The contribution of foreign invested firms to China’s economy has been remarkable. FDI 
accounted for about 9 percent of total investment in fixed assets, 31 percent of industrial output, 
and 55 percent of foreign trade in 2003.14
When a foreign firm acquires a domestic firm or sets up a joint venture with a domestic 
firm, it usually brings more advanced technology and managerial techniques to the new firm. In 
a survey of 127 foreign invested firms by Jiang (2002), 65 percent of the firms adopted some 
technology that filled in the technological gaps in China. In addition, in a transition economy like 
China, foreign investment can facilitate the restructuring of state-owned enterprises by cutting 
government-enterprise relation and hardening the budget constraint. For example, when foreign 
investors join an existing firm, they usually demand that professional managers take over the 
decision rights from government-appointed officials. 
The technology spillovers from FDI to domestic firms can be found in mobile phone 
industry. China’s domestic firms began to produce mobile phones in 1999. Driven by the rapid 
growth of the market, domestic firms quickly improve their products by borrowing new 
technology from foreign invested firms in China. In only a few years, their market share jumped 
from 2 percent in 1999 to over 60 percent in 2003 (Long, 2005). 
The foreign firms often develop close vertical relationships with Chinese firms. For 
example, Motorola plant in Tianjin is supplied by about 80 supporting firms in Tianjin and 170 
firms outside Tianjin. Most of them are domestic firms. Motorola often sends personnel to offer 
technical guidance to these local suppliers. 
 
                                                 
14 Source: Author’s Calculation based on China Statistical Yearbook (2004). 
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 3.3. Measurement and Data 
3.3.1. Measuring Horizontal Spillovers 
The variable, jtHorizontal , measures the foreign presence in the firm’s own industry j at time t. It 
is calculated as follows: 
,∑
∑
∈
∈
×
=
ji
it
ji
itit
jt Sales
SalesreForeignSha
Horizontal     (3.1) 
where reoreignSha  is define as the share of firm i’s total equity owned by foreigners. We 
define the industry at the four-digit le
itF
vel. 
 
3.3.2. Measuring Backward Spillovers 
jtBackward captures the foreign presence in the downstream industries that are supplied by 
industry j. Since the firm-level dataset does not provide information about backward linkage, we 
use backward linkage values of the firm’s industry. In particular, we have 
.∑
≠ jk
jk
= ktjkjt HorizontalBackward α       (3.2) 
α is the proportion of industry j’s total output that is purchased by industry k.  We exclude the 
purchase by  own industry because we have already included 
15
 its in the regression. 
coefficient
jtHorizontal
he  jkαT is calculated using the input-output table of 1997. 
                                                
 
 
 
15 For example, suppose industry A sells 10% of its output to industry B, 30% to industry C and 60% to industry D, 
where Foreign Share is 30%, 20% and 25%, respectively. In this example, Backward of industry A = 0.1×0.3 + 
0.3×0.2 + 0.6×0.25 = 0.24. 
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 3.3.3. Measuring Forward Spillovers 
Similarly, jtForward  shows the foreign presenc stream industries from e in the up which industry 
j purchas di ing way: 
jk
ktjkjt
es its interme ate inputs. We calculate jtForward  in the follow
 .∑= HorizontalForward β       (3.3) 
≠
is the proportion of industry j’s intermediate inputs that is supplied by industry k. The jkβ
coefficient jkβ is calculated based on the input-output table of 1997. 
 
is a proxy for foreign presence in region r. We define the region at city level (four-digit 
3.3.4. Measuring Local Spillovers 
rtLocal
geographic level). The computation of rtLocal  is similar to jtHorizontal : 
,∑
∑ ×
=
it
itit
rt Sales
SalesreForeignSha
Local      (3.4) 
∈
∈
ri
ri
Tables 3.1-3.4 present basic information about these four spillover variables at the two-
digit industry level or at the provincial level. In all these variables, there is large variation across 
industries or regions. For example, as can be seen from Table 3.1, in 2003 Horizontal ranges 
from 0.2 percent in tobacco processing to 69.1 percent in electronics and telecommunications. 
 
3.3.5. The Data and Basic Patterns 
This empirical study is based on a large dataset of Chinese industrial firms built from cross-
sectional data collected in regular surveys by China National Bureau of Statistics between 2000 
and 2003. The surveys cover all state-owned firms and all non-state firms above designated 
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 scale. O
c information of each four-digit industry. The dataset contains detailed information of 
about 1
out 60 
percen
ID numbers 
after re
Table 3.6 shows that in our dataset, foreign firms account for about 20 percent of total 
nly non-state firms with sales under 5 million Yuan are excluded. The firms in our 
sample accounted for about 65 percent of total industrial value added in 2000 (Table 3.5). This 
share dropped to 53 percent in 2001 and rose to 72 percent and 79 percent in 2002 and 2003. 
Since we only focus on manufacturing sector, the sample size decreases to 140,000 to 
180,000 firms per year. The number of observations is further reduced by deleting those with 
missing values and those that fail to satisfy some basic error checks. The industry section of 
China Statistical Yearbook is complied based on this dataset. China Markets Yearbook reports 
the basi
00 variables, including ID number, ownership, sales revenue, value added, four-digit 
industry code, six-digit geographic code, exports, employment, capital stock, and intermediate 
inputs. 
We construct a panel dataset by matching the firms by their ID numbers. Only ab
t of the firms in the dataset can be matched throughout the entire period (four years). This 
is because in addition to normal exit and entry, existing firms often change their 
structuring, which significantly reduces the percentage of firms that we can match. 
number of firms in each year. Summary statistics are reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. 
To compare foreign firms with domestic firms, we estimate the following equation: 
,ln 0 ijrii reForeignShaS εααβα +++∗+=     (3.5) 
where iS  refers to firm i’s characteristics, including TFP, labor productivity defined as value-
added per worker, sales, employment, capital intensity, and wage. We estimate (3.5) separately 
for each year in our sample. In the regression, we also control for two-digit industry and 
provincial fixed effects. 
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 The estimation results reported in Table 3.9 suggest that foreign firms differ significantly 
from domestic firms. The estimated coefficient, β, has a clear economic interpretation, i.e., it 
shows the percentage differential between a wholly foreign-owned firm and a domestic firm. For 
example, in 2003, the TFP of a wholly foreign-owned firm was on average 40 percent higher 
an that of a domestic firm. In general, foreign firms are larger, more productive, more capital 
intensive, and pay higher wages. Our findings are consistent with previous studies on other 
countries (e.g., Bellak, 2004) 
3.4. Empirical Strategy 
hip between FDI and the productivity of domestic firms, we follow an 
oa  that is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Aitken and Harrison, 1999). We estimate a 
t n th t inclu illovers measures as explanatory variables. Our starting point 
      HorizontalreForeignShaKLY lnlnln
th
 
To investigate the relations
appr ch
production func io a des sp
is the following equation: 
ijrtijrtijrtijrt 21210 jtγγββα ++++=  
ijrtjrt  543 rtjtjt LocalForwardBackward ,γγγ ++++ εααα +++    (3.6) 
where 
                                                
ijrtY  is the real value-added of firm i in industry j and region r at time t, which is deflated 
by industry-specific ex-factory price index. ijrtL  is the number of employees. ijrtK  stands for the 
net value of fixed assets deflated by investment price index.16
As an exploratory regression, (3.6) is estimated with OLS on the full sample and the 
subsample of domestic firms only. Since the spillovers may take time to materialize, we also 
 
16 According to China’s accounting practice, net value of fixed assets of year t = net value of fixed assets of year t-1  
+ investment of year t – depreciation of year t. To get net value of fixed assets of year t in constant price, ideally we 
should only deflate investment of year t. Since the price level was almost constant during 2000-2003, deflating net 
value of fixed assets by investment price index makes little difference. 
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 estimate (3.6) with one-year lagged spillover variables. The model includes a full set of year, 
two-digit industry, and provincial dummies. The results are reported in Table 3.10. The standard 
errors reported throughout the chapter are corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering 
oulton, 1990). In all cases, we find positive and statistically significant coefficients on 
ble of Horizontal does not appear to be significant. The 
ometric concerns with the estimation of (3.6). The first is the omission of 
firm-sp
ent team. 
O e solution to this problem is time differencing model. Following Haskel, Pereira, and 
Slaughter (2002) and Javorcik (2004), instead of (3.6), we estimate the following first differences 
(M
Backward and Local variables. The varia
coefficient on Forward is significant only when lagged values are used. 
 
3.4.1. First Differences Estimation 
There are two econ
ecific unobservable variables. These variables may affect the correlation between firm 
productivity and FDI presence. Examples include government subsides or strong senior 
managem
n
model:  
jtijrtijrtijrtijrt HorizontalreForeignShaKLY ∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 2121 lnlnln γγββ  
3 Backwar ,54 ijrtjrtrtjtjt LocalForwardd εαααγγγ ++++∆+∆+   (3.7) 
ince differencing also removes time, region and industry effects, unlike (3.6), year, region and 
dustry dummies in (3.7) will control for unobservables that are related to the change in time, 
                                                
∆+
S
in
region and industry effects.17
 
 
 
17 For example, we control not just for “Shanghai is an attractive city for foreign investment” but also for “the 
attraction of Shanghai for foreign investment changes over time.” 
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 3.4.2. Semi-Parametric Estimation 
The second econometric problem is that OLS is biased when estimating the production function 
in (3.6) because labor and intermediate inputs are not exogenous. Griliches and Mairesse (1998) 
argue that inputs should be endogenous since they are chosen by firms after productivity is 
observed. To correct the endogeneity bias, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a semi-parametric 
estimation procedure that uses investment as a proxy for the unobservable productivity shock. 
Since t
cedure can avoid this problem because usually 
the inte
h the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure does not account 
for sele
) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) find that controlling for selection has 
little effect on the final parameter estimates. 
                                                
he Olley-Pakes procedure requires the information of investment which is not available in 
our dataset,18 we opt for the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure, which uses intermediate 
inputs rather than investment to address the underlying endogeneity issues. 
There are two advantages for the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. First, because there is 
substantial adjustment cost with capital stock, in many firm-level datasets, a large number of 
observations have zero investment. These observations must be deleted to satisfy the strict 
monotonicity condition. The Levinsohn-Petrin pro
rmediate inputs must be positive. Second, intermediate inputs provide a better proxy for 
productivity shock than investment because investment does not respond to the productivity 
shock quickly enough due to the adjustment cost. 
The advantage of the Olley-Pakes method is that the original three-stage procedure 
explicitly controls for selection bias. Althoug
ction bias, the authors argue that the use of unbalanced panel minimizes such bias. Both 
Olley and Pakes (1996
 
18 In our dataset, the investment in year t can be calculated as the difference in the original value of fixed assets 
between year t and year t - 1, but we will lose one year data, leaving only three years in our panel. 
 65
 To briefly discuss the consider the following 
io u 20
 Levinsohn-Petrin procedure,19 let us 
product n f nction:
,0 ititkitlit ly it ηωββββ ++++=      (3.8) 
where ity , itl , and itk  denote logarithms of value-added, labor and capital. Note that the error 
term has two components: (1) productivity shock, itω ; (2) the error term that is uncorrelated with 
input choices, itη . In t  equa onhe ti , itω  is a state variable and affects the input decision. 
Levinsohn and Petrin assume that demand for
firm’s 
 the intermediate inputs depends on the 
state variables itk  and itω : 
).,( itititit kmm ω=       (3.9) 
Levinsohn and Petrin show that the dem nd a function is monotonically increasing in itω . 
It is possible to invert the intermediate input dem
productivity shock 
and function and express the unobserved 
 as a function of  and : itk itmitω
).,( ititit mkωω =       (3.10) 
A further assumption follows Olley and Pakes (1996). Levinsohn and Petrin assume that 
the productivity shock follows a first-order Markov process: 
[ ] ,| 1 itititit E ξωωω += −      (3.11) 
where itξ  is a change in productivity uncorrelated with . 
Equation (3.8) can now be rewritten as 
itk
.),( ititititlit mkly ηφβ ++=       (3.12) 
                                                 
19 For complete exposition of the procedure, please refer to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
20 There are two versions of Levinsohn-Petrin procedure: one based on revenue and one based on value-added. In 
the former case, revenue is a function of labor, capital and intermediate inputs. When revenue is used, Levinsohn-
Petrin procedure requires GMM estimation in the second stage. The coefficients will only be weakly identified in 
GMM estimation with our data because we have a relatively short panel (only four years). Thus the version of value-
added is chosen in this study. 
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 where ),(),( 0 itititkitit mkkmk ωββφ ++= . 
By substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in  and  for itk itm ),( itit mkφ , it is 
possibl
3 p
qpmkly ηδβδ +++= ∑∑−     (3.13) 
Therefore, we can obtain consistent estimates of 
e to consistently estimate (3.12) using OLS as 
.
3
0 0
0 it
p q
ititpqitlit
= =
lβ  and itφ , which completes the first 
stage of the procedure. 
In the second stage, we first compute the estimated value for itφ  using 
      itlitit ly βφ ˆˆˆ −=  
3 3 p−
.ˆˆˆ
0 0p q= =
0 itl
q
it
p
itpq lmk βδδ −+= ∑∑     (3.14) 
For any candidate values *kβ , we can compute a prediction for itω  for all periods t, since 
. Using these predicted values, a consistent ap ation to itEitkitit k
*ˆˆ βφω −= proxim | −it[ ]1ωω , 
[ ]1|ˆ −ititE ω , is given by the predicted values from tω he regression 
    (3.15) 
 c puted as 
.ˆ 3 13
2
12110 ititititit εωγωγωγγω ++++= −−−
It then follows that the sample residual of the production function can be om
[ ].|ˆˆ 1* −−−−=+ itititkitlititit Ekly ωωββξη .    (3.16) 
The estimate kβˆ  is defined as the solution to 
[ ]( ).|ˆˆ *∑ −−−
t
Ekly
k
ωωβββmin 1−itititkitlit      (3.17) 
 A bootstrap approach is used to . calculate the standard errors for lβˆ  and βˆk
 67
 The Levinsohn-Petrin procedure is implemented in this dissertation using the Stata 
module “levpet” developed by Petrin, Levinsohn and Poi (2004). 
We perform the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure for each two-digit industry separately. The 
measure of lnTFP is calculated as follows: 
milar results. The size of the 
coefficients does not ch
deviation (5 percentage points) increase in the foreign presence in the downstream industries is 
associated with 3.2 percent increase in TFP of the domestic firms in the supplying industry. A 
.itkitlitit klyTFP ββ +−=      (3.18) 
 
3.5. Estimation Results 
3.5.1. Baseline Specifications 
The estimation of the first differences model, Equation (3.7), produces findings of 
backward spillovers and local spillovers. The first two columns of Table 3.11 present the 
estimation results for all firms (full sample) and the subsample of domestic firms, respectively. 
In both cases, the coefficients on backward spillovers and local spillovers appear to be positive 
and statistically significant. The third and fourth columns report the results from the regressions 
with ∆lnTFP, which is calculated through the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. Again positive and 
significant coefficients on backward spillovers and local spillovers can be found for both the full 
sample and the subsample of domestic firms. As shown by the last two columns of Table 3.11, 
the regressions with labor productivity produce qualitatively si
ˆˆln
ange very much across specifications. In the case of domestic firms, the 
coefficient on backward spillovers is larger while the coefficient on local spillovers is smaller. 
The backward and local spillover effects are also quantitatively significant. A one-standard-
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 one-standard-deviation (13 percentage points) increase in the foreign presence in a city raises the 
TFP of the domestic firms in the same city by 4 percent.21
rted in Table 3.12. A positive and significant coefficient on backward 
illovers can be found in all regressions except in the case of labor productivity for the 
pl e of local spillovers has a significantly positive 
s not clear which types of foreign firms are more 
likely to generate spillovers to domestic firms. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are among newly 
                                                
Little evidence can be found for other channels of spillovers. In most cases, the 
coefficient on the horizontal spillovers bears a negative sign but appears statistically 
insignificant. This finding is consistent with previous research that generally fails to find positive 
horizontal spillovers in developing countries. The variable of forward spillovers has a positive 
sign but it is not statistically significant. 
In order to check the robustness of the results, we estimate a model in second differences. 
The main cost of differencing is that it can aggravate measurement error in the independent 
variables. Longer time differences tend to attenuate this problem (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) 
but they also reduce the sample size. The estimation results of the regressions with second 
differences are repo
sp
subsam e of domestic firms. The variabl
coefficient in all cases, although the size of the coefficient is smaller compared to first 
differences. There is no robust evidence of horizontal and forward spillovers in the model of 
second differences. 
 
3.5.2. HMT firms versus OECD firms 
Chinese statistics identify two types of foreign invested firms in China: those invested by 
overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT), and those invested by foreign 
investors mainly from OECD countries. It i
 
21 The calculation is based on the fourth column of Table 3.10. 
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 industr
ized brand names. 
.22 We find robust evidence of backward spillovers and local spillovers from both 
MT and OECD firms, which is consistent with our previous findings. The size of the 
aller in the case of OECD firms, indicating that these firms rely 
 to domestic firms are only generated if the technology 
gap be
                                                
ialized economies. The investors from these regions have additional advantages of same 
culture, same language, geographical proximity, or even family ties. Compared with HMT firms, 
the advantages of OECD firms lie in their more advanced technology, global production chain 
and internationally recogn
To investigate whether there exist different impacts of HMT and OECD firms, we 
estimate (3.7) separately for these two types of firms. Spillover variables are constructed using a 
new modified Foreign Share variable, which is now defined as the share of firm’s equity owned 
by HMT (OECD) firms. 
The results from the regressions with the subsample of domestic firms are reported in 
Table 3.13
H
coefficient on Backward is sm
more on their own global supply chain. There is little evidence of spillovers through other 
channels. 
 
3.5.3. Technological Gap 
Recent studies on FDI find that horizontal spillovers depend on the absorptive capacity of the 
domestic firms. If the technological gap between foreign and domestic firms is large, domestic 
firms may lack the ability needed to adopt the new technology. Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee 
(1998) argue that positive FDI spillovers
tween the foreign firms and the domestic firm is not too wide. Using a cross-section of 
firm-level data for Uruguay, Kokko, Tansini, and Zejan (1996) find evidence for productivity 
 
22 There is no big difference between the results from the full sample and the subsample. Since we are more 
interested in the spillover effects on domestic firms, we only report the results using the subsample of domestic 
firms. 
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 spillovers to domestic firms with moderate technological gaps, but not for firms that use 
considerably lower levels of technology. 
Technological gap can also be important for vertical spillovers. Even if the foreign firms 
outsour
to local 
supplie
ne 
ecification. In most cases, the coefficients on Backward and Local have positive signs and are 
rizontal is negative and 
international markets tend to put less pressure on domestic competitors. Second, 
export-
ce locally, their local suppliers may fail to learn and absorb the technology transferred if 
they are far behind their foreign partners in productivity (Smarzynska, 2002). Thus absorptive 
capacity of local supplier is an important factors driving technology transfer from FDI 
rs. 
We reestimate the first differences model with the subsample of the most productive 
domestic firms. For each two-digit industry, we select those domestic firms whose average TFP 
over the period 2000-2003 falls into top 25 percent of all domestic firms in that industry. 
The results shown in Table 3.14 exhibit patterns that are similar to the baseli
sp
statistically significant. A notable difference is that the coefficient on Ho
statistically significant in the cases of TFP and labor productivity. This finding is consistent with 
the observation that foreign firms are often competing head-to-head with elite domestic firms. 
 
3.5.4. Export-Oriented versus Domestic-Market-Oriented FDI 
It has been suggested that the market orientation of the foreign firms is likely to affect both 
horizontal and vertical spillovers (Sgard, 2001; Javorcik, 2004). First, domestic-market-oriented 
foreign firms take market share directly from domestic firms, while export-oriented foreign firms 
that target 
oriented foreign firms are often part of global production network. They usually depend 
on the suppliers from their parent company or their affiliates in other countries. Therefore, 
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 export-oriented foreign firms are more likely to generate horizontal spillovers but not backward 
spillovers. 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate (3.7) using only export-oriented foreign firms as our 
measure of foreign presence. In our dataset, about 70 percent of foreign firms were engaged in 
exports between 2000 and 2003. Export-oriented firms are defined as those firms that exported 
90 percent of their production. 
The estimation results in the last three columns of Table 3.14 indicate that in terms of 
ductivity spillovers, export-oriented foreign firms are not very different from domestic-
market-oriented foreign firms. Again we find the same positive backward and local spillovers. 
The coefficient on Horizontal turns positive but remains statistically insignificant.  
 
     
pro
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 Table 3.1   Horizontal Spillover Variable by Two-Digit Industry 
           Unit: % 
 Code Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 
6 Coal Mining & Processing 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 
7 Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 2.3 7.2 6.8 5.7 
8 Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.7 
9 Non-Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 
10 Nonmetal Minerals Mining & Processing 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.6 
13 Food Processing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
14 Food Production 17.8 17.3 18.7 19.1 
15 Beverage Production 31.4 34.3 30.2 31.9 
16 Tobacco Processing 23.6 24.4 26.1 27.3 
17 Textile 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 15.3 16.4 16.7 17.9 
19 Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 36.0 36.0 35.1 36.5 
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane &Palm  44.9 42.6 41.5 40.6 
21 Furniture Manufacturing 21.3 22.1 21.0 20.9 
22 Papermaking & Paper Products 36.3 37.0 37.1 42.8 
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 24.0 25.5 25.5 25.3 
24 Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 20.8 23.9 23.2 24.6 
25 Petroleum Processing, Coking Products, & Gas  51.2 50.9 51.6 52.0 
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 4.7 6.6 7.6 6.9 
27 Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 15.3 16.6 17.3 19.1 
28 Chemical Fibers 16.5 15.4 15.1 15.4 
29 Rubber Products 23.2 18.7 18.5 15.3 
30 Plastic Products 26.7 27.4 29.3 29.6 
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 35.3 34.5 33.1 35.0 
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 12.9 13.7 13.5 12.1 
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals 4.9 6.0 6.4 7.4 
34 Metal Products 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.8 
35 General Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 28.8 27.4 27.6 26.8 
36 Special Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 17.3 17.1 17.7 19.5 
37 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 11.8 14.6 15.1 15.9 
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 19.1 20.3 19.0 21.9 
41 Electronic & Telecommunications 27.7 28.1 28.1 29.0 
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Office Equipment 56.2 59.7 63.1 69.1 
43 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 51.4 53.4 55.5 61.5 
44 Production and Distribution of Electric Power and Heat 35.0 35.1 35.3 32.8 
45 Production and Distribution of Gas 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 
46 Production and Distribution of  Water 11.3 11.1 15.9 20.9 
 
   Note: See Section 3.3 for the definition of the horizontal spillover variable.  
   Source:  Author’s calculation based on the database.  
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 Table 3.2   Backward Spillover Variable by Two-Digit Industry 
           Unit: % 
 Code Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 
6 Coal Mining & Processing 10.3 10.7 10.1 10.4 
7 Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 4.7 5.4 6.6 6.1 
8 Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 9.7 9.7 10.0 10.6 
9 Non-Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 9.7 9.7 10.0 10.6 
10 Nonmetal Minerals Mining & Processing 14.7 15.3 14.6 15.2 
13 Food Processing 31.2 30.3 28.6 29.5 
14 Food Production 31.2 30.3 28.6 29.5 
15 Beverage Production 31.2 30.3 28.6 29.5 
16 Tobacco Processing 31.2 30.3 28.6 29.5 
17 Textile 33.4 32.9 31.2 32.1 
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 19.2 20.2 19.4 20.3 
19 Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 19.2 20.2 19.4 20.3 
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane &Palm  23.3 23.9 23.0 23.8 
21 Furniture Manufacturing 23.3 23.9 23.0 23.8 
22 Papermaking & Paper Products 21.7 22.4 21.5 22.7 
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 21.7 22.4 21.5 22.7 
24 Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 21.7 22.4 21.5 22.7 
25 Petroleum Processing, Coking Products, & Gas  13.1 13.4 12.8 13.3 
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 23.9 25.0 24.2 25.5 
27 Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 23.9 25.0 24.2 25.5 
28 Chemical Fibers 23.9 25.0 24.2 25.5 
29 Rubber Products 23.9 25.0 24.2 25.5 
30 Plastic Products 23.9 25.0 24.2 25.5 
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 23.3 24.5 24.0 25.9 
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 23.7 23.9 23.1 23.9 
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals 23.7 23.9 23.1 23.9 
34 Metal Products 21.5 22.6 21.8 23.0 
35 General Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 15.9 16.3 15.1 15.6 
36 Special Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 15.9 16.3 15.1 15.6 
37 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 14.7 15.2 14.8 15.4 
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 24.7 27.0 26.3 28.9 
41 Electronic & Telecommunications 26.3 27.2 26.5 28.3 
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Office Equipment 15.2 15.7 15.0 15.6 
43 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 19.5 20.2 19.5 20.5 
44 Production and Distribution of Electric Power and Heat 15.2 15.5 15.0 15.6 
45 Production and Distribution of Gas 15.5 15.8 15.4 16.2 
46 Production and Distribution of  Water 17.2 17.7 17.0 17.7 
 
   Note: See Section 3.3 for the definition of the backward spillover variable.  
   Source:  Author’s calculation based on the database and 1997 input-output table.  
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 Table 3.3   Forward Spillover Variable by Two-Digit Industry 
           Unit: % 
 Code Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 
6 Coal Mining & Processing 14.9 15.1 14.6 15.1 
7 Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 17.2 17.8 17.2 17.9 
8 Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 15.8 16.1 15.3 15.8 
9 Non-Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 15.8 16.1 15.3 15.8 
10 Nonmetal Minerals Mining & Processing 15.1 15.6 14.7 15.2 
13 Food Processing 20.7 21.3 20.3 20.8 
14 Food Production 20.7 21.3 20.3 20.8 
15 Beverage Production 20.7 21.3 20.3 20.8 
16 Tobacco Processing 20.7 21.3 20.3 20.8 
17 Textile 19.9 20.0 18.7 19.5 
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 17.0 18.1 17.6 18.5 
19 Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 17.0 18.1 17.6 18.5 
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane &Palm  18.5 18.7 18.0 18.6 
21 Furniture Manufacturing 18.5 18.7 18.0 18.6 
22 Papermaking & Paper Products 20.1 20.6 19.7 20.6 
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 20.1 20.6 19.7 20.6 
24 Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 20.1 20.6 19.7 20.6 
25 Petroleum Processing, Coking Products, & Gas  2.8 3.3 3.7 3.3 
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 12.5 13.2 12.8 13.1 
27 Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 12.5 13.2 12.8 13.1 
28 Chemical Fibers 12.5 13.2 12.8 13.1 
29 Rubber Products 12.5 13.2 12.8 13.1 
30 Plastic Products 12.5 13.2 12.8 13.1 
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 13.9 14.3 13.7 14.0 
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.9 
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.9 
34 Metal Products 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.3 
35 General Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 16.7 17.0 16.9 17.9 
36 Special Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 16.7 17.0 16.9 17.9 
37 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 16.4 16.9 16.5 17.3 
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 17.6 18.1 17.7 18.9 
41 Electronic & Telecommunications 21.6 21.7 21.1 21.9 
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Office Equipment 28.9 30.9 30.6 33.3 
43 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 18.6 19.0 18.4 19.1 
44 Production and Distribution of Electric Power and Heat 10.2 10.8 10.7 11.2 
45 Production and Distribution of Gas 5.4 5.9 5.8 5.8 
46 Production and Distribution of  Water 13.0 13.2 12.3 12.6 
 
   Note: See Section 3.3 for the definition of the forward spillover variable.  
   Source:  Author’s calculation based on the database and 1997 input-output table.  
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 Table 3.4   Local Spillover Variable by Province 
         Unit: % 
 
Rank in 2003 Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Guangdong  44.7 49.4 50.7 55.1 
2 Fujian  47.8 49.5 46.8 46.9 
3 Shanghai  34.2 35.3 37.7 45.0 
4 Tianjin  33.7 40.1 28.8 37.8 
5 Jiangsu  21.8 23.4 25.2 28.4 
6 Beijing  16.2 29.9 25.5 26.9 
7 Liaoning  15.5 15.3 16.0 16.1 
8 Zhejiang  13.9 14.4 12.8 12.8 
9 Hainan 17.3 14.1 12.3 12.3 
10 Chongqing 10.9 10.8 10.4 12.1 
11 Guangxi 7.5 9.0 11.6 12.0 
12 Shandong  11.4 10.5 9.7 9.7 
13 Anhui  8.6 10.9 10.2 9.5 
14 Hebei  6.8 6.3 6.5 7.6 
15 Hubei  6.0 6.3 6.7 7.5 
16 Inner Mongolia   4.3 4.9 6.6 
17 Hunan  6.2 5.7 5.5 5.7 
18 Jilin   10.9 4.6 5.3 
19 Sichuan  4.5 4.8 5.1 5.1 
20 Jiangxi  5.2 6.0 4.1 4.4 
21 Xinjiang 1.0 0.7 2.8 4.2 
22 Guizhou  4.0 3.7 4.5 4.1 
23 Henan  5.1 3.7 3.7 3.8 
24 Ningxia 3.3 2.9 3.0 3.8 
25 Shaanxi  3.4 4.3 3.4 3.4 
26 Heilongjiang  2.3 2.7 2.9 3.2 
27 Shanxi  2.1 2.5 2.3 2.8 
28 Yunnan  1.6 1.7 2.4 1.9 
29 Qinghai  1.2 0.4 1.1 1.8 
30 Gansu  0.9 1.8 1.9 1.5 
31 Tibet  0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
   Note: See Section 3.3 for the definition of the local spillover variable.  
   Source:  Author’s calculation based on the database.  
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 Table 3.5   Coverage of the Database 
          Unit: Trillion Yuan 
 
 
(a) Value Added of All 
Firms in the Database (b) GDP of Industrial Sector (a)/(b) 
2000 2.54 3.90 0.65 
2001 2.23 4.24 0.53 
2002 3.30 4.60 0.72 
2003 4.20 5.31 0.79 
 
Source: Figures of GDP of industrial sector are from China Statistical Yearbook (2004), Table 3-1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6   Number of Foreign Firms in the Database 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Number of Firms 129,432 131,631 157,687 178,044 
Total Number of Foreign Firms 26,965 28,327 32,766 37,443 
         ─   HMT Firms 15,677 16,375 18,056 20,520 
         ─  OECD Firms 12,499 13,281 16,452 18,677 
 
Source: China National Statistical Bureau Enterprise Database. HMT firms are partly or fully funded by investors 
from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. OECD firms are partly or fully funded by investors from OECD countries. 
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 Table 3.7   Summary Statistics 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Levels 
__________________________________ 
 
Summary Statistics for First Differences 
_________________________________ 
 
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
lnY 548,421 8.3536 1.4526 290,122 0.1330 0.9701 
lnL 548,421 8.2685 1.7035 290,122 0.0559 0.6465 
lnK 548,421 4.8865 1.1321 290,122 0.0151 0.4263 
ln(Foreign Share) 545,076 0.1553 0.3297 287,511 0.0015 0.1192 
Horizontal 548,421 0.2349 0.1647 290,122 0.0040 0.0608 
Backward 548,421 0.2352 0.0503 290,122 0.0032 0.0150 
Forward 548,421 0.1661 0.0408 290,122 0.0023 0.0113 
Local 548,421 0.2000 0.1890 290,122 0.0078 0.0355 
 
    Source:  Author’s calculation based on the database.  
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 Table 3.8   Additional Summary Statistics of Spillover Variables 
 
Horizontal 
______________________ 
Backward 
______________________ 
Forward 
______________________ 
Local 
______________________ 
 
Year 
Number 
of 
Industries 
Mean St. Dev. 
Number 
of 
Industries 
Mean St. Dev. 
Number 
of 
Industries 
Mean St. Dev. 
Number 
of Cities Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
2000 520 0.2204 0.1889 29 0.2294 0.0526 29 0.1641 0.0521 364 0.0870 0.1285 
2001 521 0.2300 0.1947 29 0.2348 0.0495 29 0.1698 0.0535 357 0.0799 0.1298 
2002 530 0.2235 0.1882 29 0.2252 0.0471 29 0.1643 0.0512 351 0.0821 0.1298 
2003 525 0.2245 0.1915 29 0.2357 0.0496 29 0.1710 0.0554 351 0.0855 0.1342 
 
  Source:  Author’s calculation based on the database.  
 
 
 
Table 3.9   Firm Differentials of Characteristics between Foreign and Domestic Firms 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
lnTFP 0.5477 (0.0374) 
0.6220 
(0.0301) 
0.4596 
(0.0239) 
0.3959 
(0.0230) 
ln(Value Added per Worker) 0.4570 (0.0638) 
0.4904 
(0.0507) 
0.2919 
(0.0412) 
0.1804 
(0.0398) 
ln(Sales) 0.8216 (0.0369) 
0.7440 
(0.0301) 
0.6953 
(0.0432) 
0.6657 
(0.0261) 
ln(Employment) 0.2957 (0.0386) 
0.3518 
(0.0349) 
0.3890 
(0.0340) 
0.4419 
(0.0326) 
ln(Captial per Worker) 0.7368 (0.0601) 
0.7221 
(0.0510) 
0.6545 
(0.0432) 
0.5798 
(0.0396) 
ln(Wage per Worker) 0.4411 (0.0295) 
0.4068 
(0.0246) 
0.3819 
(0.0277) 
0.3503 
(0.0188) 
Number of Observations 128,589 130,747 156,450 176,768 
 
Notes: All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. All regressions include a full set of two-digit industry, ownership 
and provincial dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province 
clustering. 
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 Table 3.10   OLS with Lagged and Contemporaneous Spillover Variables 
Dependent Variable: lnY 
Contemporaneous  
Spillover variables 
____________________________ 
Lagged Spillovers  
Variables 
_____________________________  
   All Firms Domestic Firms    All Firms Domestic Firms 
lnK 0.2522*** (0.0035) 
0.2219*** 
(0.0040) 
0.2661*** 
(0.0042) 
0.2312*** 
(0.0048) 
lnL 0.5454*** (0.0064) 
0.5625*** 
(0.0072) 
0.5650*** 
(0.0073) 
0.5909*** 
(0.0084) 
Foreign Share 0.2353*** (0.0279)  
0.2468*** 
(0.0293)  
Horizontal 0.0589 (0.0387) 
0.0305 
(0.0451)   
Horizontal 
Lagged   
0.0365 
(0.0404) 
0.0353 
(0.0575) 
Backward 1.3673** (0.6455) 
1.6190** 
(0.6840)   
Backward 
Lagged   
1.0736*** 
(0.3012) 
1.1630*** 
(0.3580) 
Forward 1.3722 (1.3417) 
1.5139 
(1.3662)   
Forward Lagged   0.4894* (0.2845) 
0.8733** 
(0.3548) 
Local 0.1209*** (0.0395) 
0.1598*** 
(0.0457)   
Local Lagged   0.1877*** (0.0494) 
0.1689*** 
(0.0575) 
Number of 
Observations 545,076 425,462 288,743 218,864 
R2 0.9319 0.9241 0.9379 0.9354 
 
Notes: All regressions include time dummies, two-digit industry dummies and provincial dummies. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. * 
denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 3.11   Regression in First Differences: Baseline Specifications 
 
 
∆lnY 
____ _________________
 
∆ln(TFP) 
____ _________________
 
∆ln(Labor Productivity) 
____ _________________
 
All Firms Domestic Firms All Firms 
Domestic 
Firms All Firms 
Domestic 
Firms 
∆lnK 0.0854*** (0.0040) 
0.0827 
(0.0041)     
∆lnL 0.3038*** (0.0082) 
0.2913 
(0.0091)     
∆Foreign 
Share 
0.1143* 
(0.0604)  
0.1256** 
(0.0608)  
0.0356 
(0.0668)  
∆Horizontal -0.0014 (0.0354) 
-0.0435 
(0.0396) 
-0.0033 
(0.0352) 
-0.0459 
(0.0395) 
0.0115 
(0.0380) 
-0.0264 
(0.0424) 
∆Backward 0.6322** (0.3128) 
0.8149** 
(0.3532) 
0.6448** 
(0.3103) 
0.8189** 
(0.3501) 
0.5347* 
(0.3201) 
0.7457** 
(0.3754) 
∆Forward 0.1571 (0.2416) 
0.0413 
(0.2862) 
0.1685 
(0.2370) 
0.0514 
(0.2818) 
0.1411 
(0.2710) 
0.0721 
(0.3214) 
∆Local 0.3949*** (0.1038) 
0.2971** 
(0.1181) 
0.3975*** 
(0.1027) 
0.2917** 
(0.1170) 
0.4153*** 
(0.1139) 
0.3296** 
(0.1297) 
Number of 
Observations 287,511 218,864 287,511 218,864 287,511 218,864 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 
 
 
Notes: All regressions include time dummies, two-digit industry dummies and provincial dummies. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. * denotes statistical significance at 
the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 3.12   Regression in Second Differences: Baseline Specifications 
 
 
∆lnY 
____ _________________
 
∆ln(TFP) 
____ _________________
 
∆ln(Labor Productivity) 
____ _________________
 
All Firms Domestic Firms All Firms 
Domestic 
Firms All Firms 
Domestic 
Firms 
∆lnK 0.1169*** (0.0049) 
0.1118*** 
(0.0054)     
∆lnL 0.4216*** (0.0093) 
0.4072*** 
(0.0098)     
∆Foreign 
Share 
0.3408*** 
(0.0996)  
0.3358*** 
(0.0965)  
0.3127*** 
(0.1056)  
∆Horizontal -0.0759 (0.0594) 
-0.1185* 
(0.0654) 
-0.0796 
(0.0589) 
-0.1174* 
(0.0648) 
-0.0659 
(0.0639) 
-0.0832 
(0.0745) 
∆Backward 0.3689* (0.2072) 
0.5861** 
(0.2664) 
0.3765** 
(0.1910) 
0.5979** 
(0.2608) 
0.3587* 
(0.2084) 
0.4595 
(0.3321) 
∆Forward -0.0822 (0.4063) 
0.0014 
(0.4219) 
-0.0871 
(0.4159) 
0.0023 
(0.4394) 
-0.0736 
(0.3689) 
0.0036 
(0.4398) 
∆Local 0.1346** (0.0635) 
0.1548** 
(0.0731) 
0.1456** 
(0.0677) 
0.1626** 
(0.0730) 
0.1226* 
(0.0705) 
0.1775* 
(0.0986) 
Number of 
Observations 141,516 104,698 141,516 104,698 141,516 104,698 
R2 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.07 
 
Notes: All regressions include time dummies, two-digit industry dummies and provincial dummies. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. * denotes statistical significance 
at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 
level. 
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 Table 3.13   Regression in First Differences: Robustness Checks 
 
 
Spillovers from HMT FDI 
____________________________________
 
Spillovers from OECD FDI 
____________________________________
 
∆lnY ∆ln(TFP) ∆ln(Labor Productivity) ∆lnY ∆ln(TFP) 
∆ln(Labor 
Productivity) 
∆lnK 0.0840*** (0.0041)   
0.0839*** 
(0.0039)   
∆lnL 0.2994*** (0.0090)   
0.2971*** 
(0.0083)   
∆Horizontal 0.0313 (0.0447) 
0.0326 
(0.0424) 
0.0445 
(0.0538) 
-0.1006* 
(0.0593) 
-0.1192 
(0.0757) 
-0.0674 
(0.0764) 
∆Backward 0.9171** (0.4497) 
0.9090** 
(0.4332) 
0.8116* 
(0.4505) 
0.3304 
(0.2065) 
0.3419* 
(0.1987) 
0.4904** 
(0.2071) 
∆Forward 0.0241 (0.0417) 
0.0195 
(0.0388) 
0.0124 
(0.0488) 
-0.2598 
(0.2564) 
-0.2651 
(0.2521) 
-0.2194 
(0.2851) 
∆Local 0.2925*** (0.0962) 
0.3007*** 
(0.0978) 
0.2958** 
(0.1278) 
0.2187** 
(0.1094) 
0.2209** 
(0.0995) 
0.3210*** 
(0.1202) 
Number of 
Observations 255,875 255,875 255,875 250,401 250,401 250,401 
R2 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 
 
Notes: We only report the results from the subsample of the domestic firms. All regressions include time dummies, 
two-digit industry dummies and provincial dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-
digit industry-province clustering. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance 
at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 3.14   Regression in First Differences: Robustness Checks (Continued) 
 
 
Top 25% Most Productive Domestic Firms 
____________________________________
 
Spillovers from Export-Oriented FDI 
____________________________________
 
∆lnY ∆ln(TFP) ∆ln(Labor Productivity) ∆lnY ∆ln(TFP) 
∆ln(Labor 
Productivity) 
∆lnK 0.0783*** (0.0081)   
0.0827*** 
(0.0041)   
∆lnL 0.2791*** (0.0126)   
0.2913*** 
(0.0091)   
∆Horizontal -0.1803** (0.0780) 
-0.1750** 
(0.0816) 
-0.1982** 
(0.0897) 
0.0057 
(0.0684) 
0.0043 
(0.0697) 
0.0111 
(0.0679) 
∆Backward 0.8185** (0.4505) 
0.8082* 
(0.4667) 
0.5936 
(0.5013) 
0.7919** 
(0.3526) 
0.7951** 
(0.3499) 
0.7292* 
(0.3739) 
∆Forward 0.0115 (0.3625) 
0.0131 
(0.3641) 
0.0239 
(0.3914) 
0.0232 
(0.2861) 
0.0325 
(0.2821) 
0.0606 
(0.3207) 
∆Local 0.2803* (0.1813) 
0.2787 
(0.1894) 
0.3536* 
(0.2004) 
0.1964* 
(0.1180) 
0.2010* 
(0.1169) 
0.2292* 
(0.1297) 
Number of 
Observations 54,716 54,716 54,716 218,864 218,864 218,864 
R2 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10 
 
Notes: We only report the results from the subsample of the domestic firms. All regressions include time dummies, 
two-digit industry dummies and provincial dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for two-
digit industry-province clustering. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance 
at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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4. EXPORTING AND PERFORMANCE: FIRM LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
 
4.1. Overview of the Literature 
4.1.1. Related Theories 
With an increasing availability of panel data at the firm level, it has been widely documented that 
exporters are “better,” more productive, larger, survive longer and pay higher wages, than non-
exporters (e.g., Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 2003; Pavcnik, 2002). There are basically 
two theoretical explanations, each emphasizing one direction of the causal relationship. 
Self-selection theory stresses the sunk costs of entering foreign markets. Recent 
theoretical works introduce heterogeneity of firms into standard monopolistic competition 
models with increasing returns. Melitz (2003) provides a general equilibrium model showing that 
firms with higher ex ante productivity self-select into export markets, i.e. only more efficient 
firms can afford the fixed costs of entry into export markets. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) 
extend the model and demonstrate that given equal trade and investment opportunities within 
sectors, firms sort according to productivity into different organizational forms: the least 
productive firms serve only the domestic markets, more productive firms export, and most 
productive firms choose to invest in foreign markets. 
Learning-by-exporting theory argues that exporting firms may benefit from the technical 
expertise of foreign buyers. For the firms in less developed economies in particular, foreign 
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 buyers may share knowledge of the latest design specifications and production techniques that 
might otherwise be unavailable. 
 
4.1.2. Empirical Studies 
Most of the empirical studies on exporting and productivity are based on firm-level panel data. 
The results, however, have been mixed. The first study to make a clear empirical distinction 
between correlation and causality is Bernard and Jensen (1999). The authors find evidence for 
the existence of sunk costs in exporting. They also find that productivity increases take place 
before exporting, suggesting selection rather than technological improvement as result of 
exporting. Using a slightly different method, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) also find strong 
evidence for self-selection in their data from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco. They do not find 
any evidence for learning effects from exporting. Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) come to the 
same conclusions for Taiwan and Korea in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Delgado, Farinas and 
Ruano (2002) consider the case of Spanish firms and find evidence of self-selection into export 
markets but no evidence for learning from exporting. 
In contrast, more recent studies find some evidence to support learning-by-exporting 
theory. These studies include Wager (2002) for Germany, Girma, Greenway and Kneller (2003) 
for the United Kingdom, Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for Chile, De Loecker (2005) for Slovenia, 
and Van Biesebroeck (2005) for sub-Saharan African countries. 
In the case of China, using a survey dataset of 2,105 firms between 1989 and 1994, Kraay 
(1999) confirms that Chinese exporters are more productive. He employes dynamic panel 
methods and finds that exporting improves labor productivity. 
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 4.2. Growth of China’s Exports 
Before the reforms began in the late 1970s, almost all trade was carried out through specialized 
foreign trade companies, whose primary responsibility was implementing central government’s 
mandatory plan. The foreign trade companies purchased goods from manufacturing firms and 
sold them in the international markets. Manufacturing firms could not negotiate and sign 
contracts with foreign customers directly because only foreign trade companies were granted the 
“trading rights for exporting.” Since the procurement prices were fixed, the foreign trade 
companies frequently incurred export losses, which were usually subsidized by the central 
government. All foreign exchange received was handed over to the central bank at the official 
rate. 
China’s reforms of its foreign trade system took place in several key aspects, including 
granting trading rights to manufacturing firms, a reduction and eventual elimination of the 
mandatory plan, and reforming foreign exchange regime (Lardy, 2001, p. 46). The most dramatic 
change was the expansion of trading rights. In 1978, only 12 specialized foreign trade companies 
had the trading rights. By 2001 the government had granted trading rights to 35,000 firms, 
including many private firms (Lardy, 2005). The direct planning of exports was replaced by 
decentralized, market-oriented transactions. The mandatory export plan was sharply reduced in 
the 1980s and abolished in 1991. China established the dual-track system of foreign exchange in 
the 1980s. The government unified the exchange rate in 1994, which led to substantial 
depreciation of the official exchange rate. 
These trade reforms, combined with other export promotion policies such as rebate of 
value-added taxes on exports and duty drawback system, have helped transform China into a 
major trading power. China’s exports grew from $18 billion in 1980 to $593 billion in 2004 
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 (Figure 1.3), while over the same period the ratio of exports to GDP rose from 0.06 to 0.31 
(Table 4.1). During the period of this study (2000-2003), stimulated by China’s entry into WTO 
in early 2001, the annual growth rate of Chinese exports was as high as 30 percent. 
The most impressive export performance in China came from foreign invested firms and 
Chinese firms that are engaged in export processing. As compared with ordinary trade, export 
processing plays an increasingly important role in China’s exports. Foreign parts and 
components are brought in, assembled or processed using relatively low-cost Chinese labor, and 
then exported to the international markets. In 2002, 55 percent of China’s exports came from 
export processing.23
A large part of the China’s overall success in exports can be attributed to the strong 
export orientation of foreign invested firms (Huang, 2001). The contribution of foreign invested 
firms to total exports jumped from only 1 percent in 1985 to 55 percent in 2003 (Table 4.1).24 In 
the electronics and telecommunications industry, for example, foreign invested firms accounted 
for 95 percent of Chinese exports. 
According to Chinese trade data, China’s five largest export markets in 2003 were the 
United States, Hong Kong, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea.25 Regarding the 
regional pattern of exports within China, the exporting sector is highly concentrated in coastal 
provinces. In 2003, Guangdong province alone accounted for one third of China’s exports. 
Table 4.1 also shows the change of the composition of China’s exported goods. In the 
first half of the 1980s, boosted by the exports of crude oil, primary products (mainly agricultural 
                                                 
23 Source: Author’s calculation based on Table 2-7, China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (2003), p. 19. 
24 Source: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (2003), Table 2-26, p. 102. 
25 China’s trade data often differ significantly from those of its major trading partners. This is because a large share 
of China’s trade passes through Hong Kong. China treats a large share of its exports through Hong Kong as Chinese 
exports to Hong Kong, while countries that import Chinese products through Hong Kong generally attribute their 
origin to China. 
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 products and minerals) comprised about half of China’s exports. Primary products are essentially 
homogeneous goods, therefore little marketing knowledge is needed to sell them. The exporting 
of manufactured goods requires more sophisticated understanding of consumer preference, 
quality standard, and so forth. After the mid-1980s, the share of manufactured products rose 
continuously from 49 percent in 1985 to 92 percent in 2003. The largest exporting sector under 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is machinery and transport equipment, 
accounting for 39 percent of the total exports in 2003. 
 
4.3. The Data and Basic Patterns 
The data came from the regular surveys by China National Bureau of Statistics between 
2000 and 2003. We described the data in Section 3.3. 
In this chapter, a firm is defined as an exporter if its exports are positive. Table 4.2 shows 
that in our dataset, exporters account for about 25 percent of total number of firms in each year. 
Table 4.3 presents basic information about the export propensity (exports to sales ratio) at two-
digit industry level. 
To see how exporters and non-exporters differ, following Bernard and Jensen (1999) and 
others, we estimate the following equation: 
  ln ,321 iii ProvinceIndustryOwnershipEXPS εγγγβα +++++=    (4.1) 
where i is firm i’s characteristics, including TFP, labor productivity defined as value-added per 
worker, sales, employment, capital intensity, and wage. The measure of TFP is obtained through 
the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure, which was discussed in Section 3.4.  is a dummy variable 
S
iEXP
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 indicating the export status.26 In the regression, we also control for ownership, two-digit industry 
and provincial fixed effects. We estimate (4.1) separately for each year in our sample. The 
coefficient on iXP  tells us whether the relevant firm characteristic is different for exporting 
firms relative to non-exporting firms. More precisely, it reveals the percentage differential 
between exporters and non-ex
E
porters. 
                                                
The estimation results are reported in Table 4.4. We find significant difference between 
exporters and non-exporters for all characteristics. Using TFP as a measure for firm 
performance, exporters were on average 46 percent more productive in 2000, but the TFP gap 
decreased to 36 percent in 2003. Furthermore, exporters are larger in size and pay higher wages. 
These results are generally consistent with previous findings. In contrast to the existing studies, 
we find that exporters are less capital intensive and have lower labor productivity. Given China’s 
comparative advantage in labor intensive goods, it is not surprising that exporters are less capital 
intensive in China. Exporters tend to have higher TFP but lower labor productivity probably 
because they are more labor intensive and they utilize capital more efficiently. 
 
4.4. Testing Self-Selection Hypothesis 
The self-selection hypothesis suggests that exporting will be profitable only for more productive 
firms. In this context, initial productivity would be important to explain why some firms begin to 
export and others only sell in the domestic markets. To examine the empirical validity of this 
hypothesis, we focus on those firms that do not export initially, which can be further classified 
into two groups: those that start exporting in the next year and those that stay as non-exporters. 
 
26 We can also use the export propensity as a measure. When the export propensity is used in the regression, the 
results are qualitatively the same. 
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 Since our data span 2000-2003, we have three cohorts of export starters and non-exporters: 
2000-2001, 2001-2002, and 2002-2003. Pooling these cohorts results in data for 10,391 export 
starters and 189,358 non-exporters. We estimate the probability of exporting as a function of ex-
ante firm performance. In this framework, a positive relationship between ex-ante TFP and 
probability of exporting would support the self-selection hypothesis. Our probit model is 
specified as follows: 
{ } { },,,,,11 YearIndustryProvinceOwnershipXNEWEXPP itit Φ==+   (4.2) 
where )(⋅  is the normal cumulative distribution funct XP { }1,0∈  is an indicator 
variable of whether the firm entered the export markets. X is a vector of firm characteristics that 
affect the probability of exporting. Based on previous literature (for example, Bernard and 
Jensen, 2004), these variables include TFP, firm size measured by sales, firm age, capital 
intensity, wage rate and the share of new product in sales. The wage rate reflects the skill level of 
the labor, while the share of new product in sales measures the innovation activity. We also 
include a full set of ownership, three-digit industry, year and provincial dummies. Since we have 
three cohorts in the regression, the year dummies capture the effects of events tha
Φ ion.
t occur in 
calenda
 age, capital intensity and wage all 
ear expected signs, but they are not statistically significant. 
 
 NEWE
r time. 
The results reported in Table 4.5 support the self-selection hypothesis. The estimates, 
which correspond to the marginal effects, show that the probability of exporting is, as expected, 
increasing in the initial productivity of the firms. The estimation results also indicate that those 
firms initially bigger, with foreign ownership, and with larger share of new product in sales, are 
more likely to enter the export markets. The coefficients on
b
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 4.5. Testing Learning-by-Exporting Hypothesis 
4.5.1. Empirical Strategy 
Assume a study finds that firms entering the export markets have substantially higher 
productivity in the following years than non-exporters. That finding does not imply a causal 
effect of exporting on productivity. If better firms self-select into exporting, we would expect 
that they should perform better in the future even if they do not start to export. But we cannot 
observe what they would do had they not started to export because we simply do not observe the 
counterfactual situation. 
Our problem closely resembles the central issue in the program evaluation literature (for 
example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997): if the treated units are not selected randomly 
from a population but are self-selected according to certain criteria, the effect of a treatment 
cannot be evaluated by comparing the average performance of the treated and the non-treated. 
One solution is to construct a control group such that treated units are matched to untreated units 
that are as similar as possible at the time before the treatment. Differences after the treatment 
between the treated groups and the matched non-treated group can then be attributed to the 
treatment. 
In our analysis, let  represent the outcome variable that measures the performance of 
firm i at time t. Our primary interest lies in TFP, but we will also look at other variables such as 
labor productivity. The causal effect of starting to export for firm i at time period t +  is thus 
defined as 
itZ
s
,01 sitsit ZZ ++ −        (4.3) 
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 where 1 sitZ +  denotes the value of Z at time st +  if firm i started exporting, while 0 sitZ + the 
value of Z for firm i had it not participated in export markets. 
As we discussed earlier, the fundamental problem of causal inference i
 is 
s that  is 
s . Following the program evaluation literature, we define the average treatment 
effect o
Our causal inference relies on the construction of the counterfactual for the last term in 
the ab
An essential feature in the construction of the counterfactual is the selection of a valid 
control group. We use the method of matching to pair each export starter with a firm with similar 
characteristics drawn from a sample of non-exporters. Since matching involves comparing a 
vector of pre-entry characteristics, X, it is difficult to decide along which dimension to match the 
firms and what weights to use. To solve the dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) show that under the assumption of conditional independence, if we can match on X, we 
can also match on
 0 sitZ +
unob ervable
n the treated (average effect of exporting on export starters in our case) as 
       ].1|[]1|[]1|[ 0101 =−===−   (4.4) ++++ itsititsititsitsit NEWEXPZENEWEXPZENEWEXPZZE
ove equation. It is estimated instead by the average value of non-exporters, 
]0|[ 0 =+ itsit NEWEXPZE . 
)|1()( XNEWEXPPrXP it== , the so-called propensity score. 
The selection of X comes from the independent variables in (4.2) in Section 4.4. To 
match an export starter, we choose a non-exporter that is “closest” in terms of its propensity 
score. The matching is based on “nearest-neighbor,” which selects a non-exporter j on the 
n
0 jiNEWEXPkji
followi g criteria: 
{ } )(min|| pppp −=− ,     (4.5) =∈
where p  is the propensity score. 
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 In this study, the matching procedure is implemented with Stata module “psmatch2” 
developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
The use of a matching approach to search for causal effects of starting to export on 
produc
nstructed the control group to match the new exporters, we can use the 
standard matching estimator to evaluate the causal ef
tivity was pioneered by Wagner (2002) and later used by Girma, Greenaway and Kneller 
(2003) and Alvarez and Lopez (2005). 
After we have co
fect of starting to export on performance, 
which can be written as 
sjtsitM ZZ ++ −=δ ,      (4.6) 
where the bar indicates the average over the firms in each group. 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) argue that matching combined with difference-in-
difference (DID) will improve the quality of non-experimental evaluation studies. The 
difference-in-difference estimator removes effects of common shocks, and provides a more 
escription of the impact of exporting. This approach is a three-step procedure. First, 
the difference of average value of Z between time t and st
accurate d
+  is calculated for the exporting 
group, itsit ZZ −+ . Second, repeat step 1 for control grou calculatp and e jtsjt ZZ −+ . Third, the 
difference obtained in the step 1 is further differenced with respect to the difference obtained in 
step 2. Formally, difference-in-difference estimator is given by 
( ) ( )jtsjtitsitDID ZZZZ −−−= ++δ  .     (4.7) 
Alternatively, the difference-in ined by running the following -difference estimator can be obta
regression (Meyer, 1995): 
itgtDIDgtit ddddZ εδββα +⋅+++= )(21 ,    (4.8) 
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 where the dummy variable, ∈gd {1,0}, denotes the exporting group and the control group, while 
∈d {1,0} denotes post- and pre-exporting periods. To control for possible unobservable t factors 
at may be correlated with the performance, we extend this basic framework by addi
ct performance. In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
th ng more 
covariates that may affe
  ddZ ityearregionindustryownershipgtDIDgtit ddddddδββ εγγγγα +++++⋅ 4321) .    (4.9) 
hen s = 2, the effect of exporting over the two-year period is estimated to be 
14.2 percen
of the positive effect of exporti
                                                
+++= 21 (
   
4.5.2. Estimation Results 
Table 4.6 reports the results for lnTFP from standard matching estimator. For s = 1, we created 
an exporting group of 10,391 firms and a control group of 9,345 firms.27 When we examine the 
effect of longer period, the size of both exporting group and control group decreases quickly. 
Table 4.6 shows that the average treatment effect on the treated is positive and statistically 
significant in all cases. In the first year of exporting, the causal effect of exporting on TFP is 11.5 
percentage points. W
tage points. In the third year, the cumulative effect is even larger, reaching 16.6 
percentage points. 
The estimation results from regression (4.9) are presented in Table 4.7. The estimation 
with difference-in-difference produces similar results. However, the TFP effect estimated from 
difference-in-difference is larger in all three cases. For example, the causal effect of exporting on 
TFP is 13.3 percentage points in the entry year. In addition to TFP, we also find robust evidence 
ng on labor productivity, sales and employment. There is little 
evidence of a wage effect since the coefficient on ln(wage) is significant only when s = 2. 
 
27 Matching is implemented with replacement, so each non-exporter can be matched to more than one export starter. 
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 Since foreign firms come from international markets, it is not clear whether learning-by-
exporting theory can be applied to foreign invested firms in China. Therefore, we estimate the 
exporting effect separately for the subsamples of domestic firms and foreign invested firms. The 
results reported in Table 4.8 indicate that there is still a significant exporting effect for foreign 
investe
e estimation are presented in Table 
4.9. Although the general pattern is consiste t with our main findings, Table 4.9 shows 
significant heterogeneity among industries. Transport equipment, special machinery, garments 
and textile industries appear to have largest learning effects.  
 
 
 
 
d firms but the size of the effect is smaller. Although foreign investors already have 
international experience, for the foreign invested firms (usually in the form of joint venture), 
there is some room for learning effects. 
In our analyses, we pool all industries in the regression assuming that firms of different 
industries have the same learning effects of exporting. However, this assumption might be too 
strong. To see the differences among industries, we estimate (4.9) for selected industries. Those 
industries with fewer than 200 new exporters are excluded. The new exporters are matched by 
non-exporters in the same two-digit industry. The results of th
n
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 Table 4.1   The Structure of China’s Exports 
          Unit: Billion US Dollars 
 
Year Exports 
Share of 
Manufactured 
Products (%) 
Share of Foreign 
Invested Firms (%) 
 
Exports/GDP 
1980 18.1 49.7 0.0 0.06 
1985 27.3 49.4 1.1 0.09 
1990 62.9 74.4 12.4 0.16 
1995 148.8 85.6 31.5 0.22 
2000 249.2 89.8 47.9 0.23 
2001 266.2 90.1 50.0 0.23 
2002 325.6 91.2 52.2 0.26 
2003 438.2 92.1 54.8 0.31 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
  Sources: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (2003) and China Statistical Yearbook (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2   Number of Exporting Firms in the Dataset 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Number of Firms 129432 131631 157687 178044 
Total Number of Exporters 33224 34411 42205 48493 
       ─  Domestic Exporters 16778 17043 22236 25333 
       ─  Foreign Exporters 16446 17368 19969 23160 
  
Source: China National Statistical Bureau Enterprise Database. 
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 Table 4.3   Export Propensity by Industry (2000-2003) 
         Unit: % 
 Code Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 
6 Coal Mining & Processing 6.96 7.97 6.87 5.12 
7 Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 3.12 3.07 2.25 1.88 
8 Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 0.27 0.17 0.53 0.29 
9 Non-Ferrous Metals Mining & Processing 3.92 7.77 4.60 4.92 
10 Nonmetal Minerals Mining & Processing 9.94 8.47 9.67 8.17 
12 Logging & Transport of Timber & Bamboo 0.36 0.93 1.52 6.49 
13 Food Processing 11.71 11.43 11.78 12.54 
14 Food Production 9.92 8.87 9.52 9.87 
15 Beverage Production 2.83 2.92 3.34 3.83 
16 Tobacco Processing 0.80 0.78 0.85 1.04 
17 Textile 30.51 30.14 28.77 28.90 
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 60.70 55.58 56.38 55.63 
19 Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 63.03 58.82 58.83 56.76 
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane &Palm  15.50 17.29 19.70 21.29 
21 Furniture Manufacturing 40.21 38.82 43.50 46.98 
22 Papermaking & Paper Products 7.94 8.05 7.80 8.27 
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 6.60 8.07 8.73 11.54 
24 Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 67.64 66.31 68.52 67.55 
25 Petroleum Processing, Coking Products, & Gas  2.96 3.19 3.52 3.51 
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 10.22 9.60 9.75 9.98 
27 Medical & Pharmaceutical Products 10.44 9.72 9.42 10.80 
28 Chemical Fibers 5.62 7.33 7.51 7.32 
29 Rubber Products 26.60 23.52 22.96 22.72 
30 Plastic Products 27.72 25.75 26.86 27.07 
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 9.86 10.22 10.29 10.77 
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 5.77 3.64 3.07 2.80 
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals 11.60 8.86 10.82 10.67 
34 Metal Products 30.38 27.70 29.27 28.78 
35 General Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 17.30 15.73 15.82 15.25 
36 Special Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 9.58 10.89 8.79 9.41 
37 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 10.76 8.89 9.69 9.80 
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 21.31 21.81 23.78 26.08 
41 Electronic & Telecommunications 43.85 44.56 51.08 54.39 
42 Instruments, Meters, Cultural & Office Equipment 45.22 51.96 49.70 51.27 
43 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 57.05 56.23 58.59 57.74 
44 Production of Electric Power and Heat Power 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.26 
45 Production and Distribution of Gas 0.54 0.04 0.71 1.40 
46 Production and Distribution of  Water 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.87 
 
    Notes:  Export Propensity is defined as export to sales ratio. Source: Author’s calculation based on the database.  
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 Table 4.4   Firm Differentials of Characteristics between Exporters and Non-Exporters  
          
Characteristics 2000 2001 2002 2003 
lnTFP 0.4635 (0.0203) 
0.3998 
(0.0180) 
0.3828 
(0.0171) 
0.3590 
(0.0170) 
ln(Value Added per  
Worker) 
-0.0638 
(0.0202) 
-0.1158 
(0.0160) 
-0.1226 
(0.0155) 
-0.1401 
(0.0159) 
ln(Sales) 0.6935 (0.0248) 
0.6023 
(0.0254) 
0.5905 
(0.0230) 
0.5747 
(0.0216) 
ln(Employment) 0.7497 (0.0199) 
0.7242 
(0.0187) 
0.7062 
(0.0173) 
0.6900 
(0.0169) 
ln(Captial per Worker) -0.0733 (0.0258) 
-0.1119 
(0.0256) 
-0.1286 
(0.0252) 
-0.1620 
(0.0250) 
ln(Wage per worker) 0.1048 (0.0096) 
0.0686 
(0.0091) 
0.0677 
(0.0076) 
0.0730 
(0.0081) 
Number of Observations 129,368 131,631 157,685 178,044 
 
Notes: See Section 4.3 for the description of the regressions. All coefficients are significant at the 1%. All 
regressions include a full set of two-digit industry, ownership and provincial dummies. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors corrected for two-digit industry-province clustering. 
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 Table 4.5   Determinants of Starting to Export 
               Dependent Variable: Export Indicator at time t + 1 
 
 
 Probit (1) Probit (2) 
lnTFP at time t 0.0803*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0817*** 
(0.0052) 
Age at time t  -0.0002 (0.0005) 
Sales at time t  0.0236*** (0.0022) 
New Product Share in Sales at time t  0.2692*** (0.0335) 
Capital per worker  at time t  -0.0266 (0.0399) 
Wage per worker at time t  0.0005 (0.0004) 
Foreign Ownership at time t 0.8431*** 
(0.1374) 
0.8321*** 
(0.1375) 
Private Ownership at time t 0.2578* 
(0.1371) 
0.2574* 
(0.1376) 
Collective Ownership at time t 0.0454 
(0.1374) 
0.0469 
(0.1375) 
Number of Observations 199,713 199,713 
 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.15 
 
Notes: Both regressions include full sets of three-digit industry, year and provincial dummies. In the regressions, the 
dummy for state ownership is omitted. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 4.6   Matching Estimation of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 
           Outcome Variable: lnTFP 
 
 t +1 (entry year) t + 2 t + 3 
ATT 0.1151*** 
(0.0324) 
0.1421*** 
(0.0425) 
0.1662** 
(0.0731) 
Number of Treated 10,391 5,531 1,877 
Number of Controls 9,345 4,857 1,671 
 
Notes: Firms are matched using propensity score method. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Table 4.7   Difference-in-Difference Estimation Results (Full Sample) 
 
 
Outcome Variables t +1 (entry year) t + 2 t + 3 
lnTFP 0.1329*** 
(0.0213) 
0.1476*** 
(0.0279) 
0.1926*** 
(0.0447) 
Ln(Labor Productivity) 0.0988*** 
(0.0196) 
0.1123*** 
(0.0245) 
0.1189*** 
(0.0475) 
ln(Sales) 0.1101*** 
(0.0215) 
0.1077*** 
(0.0288) 
0.1334*** 
(0.0513) 
ln(Employment) 0.0549*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0488** 
(0.0249) 
0.0878** 
(0.0447) 
ln(Wage) 0.0179 
(0.0120) 
0.0289* 
(0.0159) 
0.0101 
(0.0282) 
Number of Treated 10,391 5,531 1,877 
Number of Controls 9,345 4,857 1,671 
 
Notes: Firms are matched using propensity score method. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on the 
White consistent covariance estimates. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 4.8   Difference-in-Difference Estimation Results (Subsamples) 
 
 
 
Domestic Firms 
__________________________________ 
 
Foreign Firms 
__________________________________ Outcome Variables 
t +1  
(entry year) 
t + 2 t + 3 
t +1  
(entry year) 
t + 2 t + 3 
lnTFP 0.1557*** 
(0.0244) 
0.1606*** 
(0.0303) 
0.2231*** 
(0.0528) 
0.1002*** 
(0.0368) 
0.1089** 
(0.0480) 
0.1673** 
(0.0728) 
ln(Labor 
Productivity) 
0.1179*** 
(0.0230) 
0.1283*** 
(0.0298) 
0.1324*** 
(0.0557) 
0.0659* 
(0.0352) 
0.0814* 
(0.0446) 
0.0958 
(0.0647) 
ln(Sales) 0.1149*** 
(0.0257) 
0.1101*** 
(0.0344) 
0.1417*** 
(0.0632) 
0.0943** 
(0.0375) 
0.0959* 
(0.0491) 
0.1109 
(0.0822) 
ln(Employment) 0.0510** 
(0.0226) 
0.0494** 
(0.0241) 
0.0901 
(0.0532) 
0.0475 
(0.0324) 
0.0444 
(0.0424) 
0.0869 
(0.0720) 
ln(Wage) 0.0187 
(0.0139) 
0.0296* 
(0.0169) 
0.0105 
(0.0316) 
0.0216 
(0.0224) 
0.0075 
(0.0289) 
0.0042 
(0.0458) 
Number of Treated 6,893 3,619 1,130 3,442 1,928 753 
Number of Controls 6,451 3,287 1,084 2,868 1,592 596 
 
Notes: Firms are matched using propensity score method. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on the 
White consistent covariance estimates. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Table 4.9   Difference-in-Difference Estimation by Selected Industries 
 
Code Industry 
Number of 
Treated 
Number of 
Controls 
Average Treatment 
Effect 
13 Food Processing 321 243 0.1174 (0.0902) 
 14 Food Production 301 264 0.0762 (0.1045) 
17 Textile 2314 1914 0.1432*** (0.0412) 
18 Garments & Other Fiber Products 1273 965 0.1523*** (0.0575) 
19 Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 454 386 -0.012 (0.1021) 
20 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane &Palm  214 157 -0.0454 (0.1179) 
24 Stationery, Educational & Sports Goods 324 261 0.1421 (0.1001) 
26 Raw Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 612 544 0.1385** (0.0732) 
30 Plastic Products 724 672 0.1082 (0.0841) 
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 512 484 0.0611 (0.0716) 
34 Metal Products 701 662 0.1231* (0.0637) 
35 General Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 614 571 0.1121 (0.0823) 
36 Special Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing 297 281 0.1735* (0.0936) 
37 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 363 315 0.1841* (0.0982) 
40 Electric Equipment & Machinery 813 732 0.0904* (0.0521) 
41 Electronic & Telecommunications 617 547 0.1390** (0.0671) 
 
Notes: Firms are matched using propensity score method. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on the White 
consistent covariance estimates. * denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 
0.05 level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As shown by the studies of vertical specialization, FDI and exporting in this dissertation, market 
forces and globalization forces changed China’s economy in a profound way. We find the 
evidence that market reforms reduced transaction costs, increased vertical specialization, and 
raising firms’ productivity. We also find the spillover effects of FDI and learning effects of 
exporting. 
 Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by exploiting rich variation in regional market 
development and vertical specialization in China’s manufacturing sector. Using instrumental 
variable method, we find a statistically and quantitatively significant relationship between 
vertical specialization and total factor productivity of firms. Our estimation results also indicate 
that industry size, neighboring output and provincial marketization index are all determinants of 
the vertical specialization. Thus, we find evidence that supports Smith’s extent-of-market theory, 
Marshall’s input sharing theory and Coase’s transaction cost theory. By studying the quantitative 
significance, we also find that transaction cost theory is more powerful in explaining vertical 
specialization of firms. This finding implies that market-oriented reform that reduces transaction 
costs is the major determinant of vertical specialization in China. We fail to find strong evidence 
that supports Stigler’s theory of industry lifecycle. 
     In Chapter 3 we analyze productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment using 
firm-level panel data from China manufacturing industries. We investigate whether there exist 
productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms through horizontal, backward, forward and 
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 local linkages. We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to the estimation of TFP, 
which allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of input factors. The estimation results 
from baseline specifications produce findings that support backward and local spillovers. As was 
the case with previous studies on developing countries, little evidence of horizontal spillovers 
can be found. As robustness checks, we distinguish spillovers from HMT investors versus OECD 
investors, and export-oriented FDI versus domestic-market-oriented FDI. Moreover, we take into 
account the absorptive capacity of domestic firms. The estimation results are consistent with our 
main findings. 
FDI is often regarded as an engine to economic development, an assumption that has led 
many governments around the world to attract FDI by offering generous financial incentives. 
Since we find positive backward and local spillovers, our study provides some support for such 
policies. 
 Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between firm productivity and export behavior in 
China’s manufacturing firms. We find that firms that enter export markets show superior initial 
performance compared to non-exporters; in other words, we discover evidence consistent with 
self-selection theory. In order to determine the direction of causality between exporting and 
productivity, we use propensity score matching technique to construct a counterfactual control 
group. The matching method controls for the non-random selection of exporting firms in our 
sample, and allows us to interpret our results as causal effects. Our findings suggest that 
exporting leads to better performance of the firms. They become on average 13 percent more 
productive after they start to export, which gives support to the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. 
The results of this study are broadly consistent with the idea that increasing access to 
export markets boosts productivity in developing countries. From an industrial policy 
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 perspective, there is a good reason to promote foreign sales over domestic sales because firms 
become better once they are active in export markets. 
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